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An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

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Further on Prime Minister Berov's Condition

Doctors Brief Media

AU0903134794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1230 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Report by Kalina Stancheva on news conference on Prime Minister Berov's condition, at the Council of Ministers Press Center in Sofia—live]

[Text] A news conference began several minutes ago, in which Colonel Dr. Milan Petrov, director of the Military Medical Academy, and Dr. Gerasimov of the Lozenets Government Hospital took part. The briefing provided exhaustive information on yesterday's events and the condition of their patient, Prime Minister Berov.

According to Col. Milan Petrov's statement and to our great joy, things are proceeding normally. Col. Petrov said that there has been an improvement in the patient's state of health as compared with yesterday, and the doctors hoped that his situation would continue to improve more quickly during the next few days.

Dr. Gerasimov was the first doctor who saw Professor Berov when he was admitted yesterday. After a medical consultation in which eminent cardiologists took part, the necessary investigations were carried out, and only then was a diagnosis made. Dr. Gerasimov agreed that the expression "cardiac crisis" that was used yesterday did not constitute a diagnosis, but merely described the state of the patient at the time of admission. The diagnosis that was announced a short time ago was a crisis of unstable stenocardia, whose effects the doctors have succeeded in bringing under control—that is, a period of so-called cardiac ischemia. So far, the doctors declared, there is no sign that Prof. Berov has a developed infarct. The doctors said they had succeeded in controlling the stenocardia, but they made the proviso, which we understand, that every problem follows its own peculiar development.

In answer to a question as to how long their patient would undergo treatment, the doctors said he would be treated for 15-30 days, depending on whether the heart attack caused any damage and how the patient's body reacts.

A further question tried unsuccessfully to commit the medical team to say whether, following his recovery, Prof. Berov would be able to return to active political life, Dr. Gerasimov somewhat jokingly said: I might be able to say if the case was one of a psychic illness, which is not the case. However, as far as a heart illness is concerned, following his recovery every individual can return to the active life he was following previously. How much of a load he can put on himself is another question. However, in recent history we have examples of presidents who have had bypass operations and had other cardiac complaints.

An explanation was given on another matter that had caused annoyance to the team of doctors and the Council of Ministers Press Center—namely, the headline in a medical journal: Prime Minister Struck Down by Third Infarct. The medical team from the Government Hospital declared that, to date, Prof. Berov had suffered only one infarct, and that was in 1972. In the present case, the attack had not developed so far as to cause an infarct.

The briefing continues, and we hope to have more information later.

Condition Improves

AU1003103194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] In the last announcement of the Governmental Press Center it is pointed out that the condition of Prime Minister Lyuben Berov continues to improve. The patient is in good spirits. He has no complaints and responds well to the medicines. We still have no information about the consultation at the Lozenets Hospital, in which the famous Israeli cardiologist Professor Moris Levi is taking part.

GOR Leader's Appeal

AU0903142094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] The Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] appeals to the political forces to continue working on fulfilling the national budget and concluding deals with the creditor banks of the London Club and the IMF, instead of exploiting Prime Minister Berov's state of health to increase tension in the country. According to GOR leader Aleksandur Tomov, the situation at the moment should not be dramatized, especially because no one currently wants new elections. Tomov assesses the recent visit of the GOR delegation to Russia as useful and timely.

Cabinet Meets Briefly, Postpones Agenda Items

AU1003093894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] The regular meeting of the cabinet today lasted less than an hour. The cabinet adopted the regulations for the activity of the Interdepartmental Committee on Priority Environmental Projects and the Development of the Republic of Bulgaria. The draft agreements for trade-economic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, and an agreement on the mutual protection of investments with Poland, also were adopted.

The cabinet decided to propose to President Zhelyu Zhelev to appoint Bulgarian Ambassador to Spain, Mikhail Petkov also to the post of Ambassador to Andora. The other items on the agenda, including the draft bill on the diplomatic service, were postponed.

Burgas Port Starts Handling Goods for FYROM

AU0903174594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Today Burgas Port started to step up its operations, after it had offered its services for handling goods shipped from and to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The first shipment of export goods from Macedonia has arrived.

A Russian cargo ship is expected to arrive with 14,000 metric tons of rice, which has to be transported to Macedonia by road. The trend is for mainly food products to be shipped to Macedonia, in return for exports of chemical industry products and raw materials.

According to a preliminary arrangement, a Macedonian delegation is expected to visit Burgas Port at the beginning of next week, with a view to signing a final agreement on handling goods shipped to and from Macedonia.

Further on Rakovski Officer Legion Petition

Unit Disclaims Action

AU1003103394 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 2 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Bozhidar Spasov: "2d Army Dissociates Itself From Rakovski Legion Petition"]

[Text] Under the leadership of Major General Gancho Denev, a meeting was held at the Plovdiv Military Club of the officers and commanders of the 2d Army, the subordinated units and detachments, and commanders of the Air Force Corps. Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Penchev, Defense Ministry parliamentary secretary Nencho Nenchev, and Lieutenant General Lyuben Pekhlivanov, deputy commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, were also present.

Two issues were discussed—the declaration of the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion and the petition organized by the legion's officers and members in connection with the defense budget, which has already been adopted.

Colonel Stefan Dervishev, commander of one of the units, said that no more than 10 officers in the Khaskovo Division are members of the officer legion. He urged the participants not to connect the opinion of the officers in the division and the garrison with the opinion of a few officers.

The commander of the 2d Army said: As a member of the Military Council of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, the Ground Troops Military Council, and commander of the 2d Army, I think it is high time to stop speculating about the Army, and 2d Army personnel support that position. The officers of our Army do not rebel. A difficult year lies ahead, and our main concern is combat training—more specifically, how to conduct training with the means that we have been allocated. Deputy Defense Minister Penchev thinks that most of the officer legion members who signed the petition have done so with a pure heart and a desire to help. However, he dissociated himself from the form utilized by the legion members.

Commentary Defends Intention

AU1003114594 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 2 Mar 94 p 12

[Commentary by Plamen Enchev: "Officer Putsch?"]

[Text] Judging the recent statement by Minister Valentin Aleksandrov, one could say that the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion has crossed all limits of democracy in the Army. The reason for the statement was the notorious petition signed by the officers of the Khaskovo Garrison, which demanded that the military budget be increased. People started to talk about a rebellion of the officers and even an army putsch. Some people even suspected that behind the petition, there was the long hand of General Lyutskanov, who was forced to retire.

Members of the legion claim that they have not violated the Constitution and described the minister's thesis as absurd. It is not easy to determine which side is correct. Visits by high-ranking officers to the headquarters of the three Bulgarian armies were intended to smooth over the scandal under the cover of seeking measures aimed at providing more means than those envisaged by the republican budget, which has already been adopted.

Precisely one year ago, the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion warned the politicians and the mass media that they would not allow vagabonds to mock our national symbols. What prompted the warning was the fact that the government and the national flag were booed at the 3 March 1993 celebrations. No one in the leadership of the Defense Ministry or the Chief Prosecutor's Office thought that the warning violated the Constitution or the Armed Forces' regulations.

It appears that the situation has changed today. High-ranking officers panicked when they realized that their subordinate officers want precisely what they themselves want—more money for the country's defense and security. Despite the fact that they wear uniforms and carry shoulder straps, the military are also citizens of our republic and enjoy the same rights as every other citizen.

On 1 March, the legion's initiative to convene a round-table on the Army's problems was supported by the National Police Trade Union. Solidarity actions were promised. Policemen said that political neutrality and the one-man-command principle should not prevent the officers and sergeants from discussing the country's vitally important problems. One could hardly object to that argument.

It is excessive to fan tension around the officers' initiative. It will only escalate tension in other areas at a time when a consensus exists among society about defense and security. The high-ranking officers should have more confidence in the lower-ranking officers, because they all serve a common cause.

Sudeten Germans Insist on Property Restitution

AU0903191194 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Franz Neubaer, spokesman of the Sudeten German Landsmanschaft, by Emilie Harantova; place and date not given: "Compensation Should Be Made Collectively, Neubauer Says"]

[Text] Prague—The Sudeten German Landsmanschaft appreciates that Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has not been silent about compensation to Sudeten Germans; nevertheless it rejects his concept. Landsmanschaft Spokesman Franz Neubauer said in an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES that Sudeten Germans must insist on their idea of collective compensation. "It is not all right for Prime Minister Klaus to try to provide compensation only on an individual basis," Neubauer said.

"If we recognized the rights of individuals, the government would have to decide whether to provide compensation to Neubauer, for example. I do not believe that they would decide in my favor. This is why we want collective solutions."

[Harantova] Klaus's concept is completely unacceptable to you, then?

[Neubauer] We would be prepared to accept even this alternative if Klaus would waive, in his new concept, the condition for granting Czech citizenship being knowledge of the Czech language and five years of residence. Even this would always have to be connected with some administrative action on the Czech side, which would make the right to return more general. If this is not what Klaus meant, I do not understand why he spoke about his new concept.

[Harantova] Let us suppose that, despite the individual solutions, we found a certain way and some Sudeten Germans wanted to settle here as Czech citizens and claim their property rights. What would happen then?

[Neubauer] There are many fields without owners in your country. Some of them lie fallow and the rest are collectivized. My mother comes from a small village near Karlovy Vary. Certain houses have disappeared, and, in the rest, I saw some Gypsies. All of it belongs to a collective farm—that is, the state.

[Harantova] The fields should be returned to their original German owners?

[Neubauer] If they want them, yes. The remaining property, whose original owners were Germans, could be used to establish a fund. From this fund, compensation could be paid out to those people whose houses have been demolished or sold to Czech owners. Again, I am stressing, we do not want to expel anyone. This would not be the correct way to begin a new coexistence. It is impossible to reduce the entire problem only to property issues. First, we have to eliminate distrust and speak again. Why does your policy not have the courage to stand up to the communists? Why is it impossible to abolish the law of May 1946 whereby crimes committed against Germans and Hungarians after the war were amnestied? In fact, this would have little impact—those are affairs of 50 years ago—but it would be a nice gesture of goodwill.

[Harantova] Do you consider the restitution of Jewish property to be a precedent?

[Neubauer] The problem of restitution shows that the inflexible conditions given by your restitution laws are unacceptable. This has become apparent in the problem of church, Jewish, and Sudeten German property. From the legal point of view, these three problems are equal. Is it possible to consider only injustices that occurred during communist rule? What about injustice before the communists? Is injustice done by communists worse than other injustices?

Kovac Gives 'State of Republic' Speech

LD0903164694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Speech by Slovak president Michal Kovac to the Slovak parliament in Bratislava—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed National Council [parliament] of the Slovak Republic! This is the first time in the post of president that I am going to deliver to you the report on the state of the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

We should not forget the negative foreign political consequences of our actions and decisions, such as the statements and actions of Slovak politicians abroad, which are not always precisely formulated and adequately coordinated, and sometimes even contradict each other. Such occurrences are given considerable and frequently exaggerated coverage in the foreign media. What is more serious still, such actions give rise to doubts about our foreign political orientation in the decisive political centers of the Western world.

This is most clearly demonstrated in the relatively frequent ignoring of Slovakia in West European politicians' addresses concerning the gradual integration of the post-communist countries in European economic, political, and security structures. I think that so far we have not done enough to achieve a proper coordination of our foreign policy and diplomacy with the needs of Slovakia's economic development and international standing.

The frequency of official high-level bilateral political contacts is a good indicator of the international standing of our Republic. On the level of government contacts, in particular, such contacts are less frequent than in comparable countries of our region. This, too, demonstrates a certain tendency to wait-and-see by representatives of, above all, traditional democratic states. [passage omitted]

We know that the democratic policy of both the state and the political parties must focus on the citizen. It should be based on his needs and interests, and it should serve him. But the mood among the public, which I have noticed and which has also been confirmed by the regular opinion polls, testifies to the great dissatisfaction of the general public with the state of public affairs in our Republic, with the activity of politicians and political organizations alike, and with the functioning of the highest state bodies. We all must, therefore, collectively and very seriously consider what causes our citizens to feel such profound distrust in our state institutions and in the actors on our political stage. [passage omitted]

I have said repeatedly that, at the moment, when we are still going through the stage of building our independent state and, at the same time, through a major transformation process, the country should be governed by a government of a broader—or broad—coalition. What I have in mind is a coalition based on a proper agreement on the most important goals that must be achieved in order to have a consolidated state and public life, a coalition that could work systematically and consistently on developing and improving our country.

However, I am not ruling out other options for solving the current crisis, either—above all, through early parliamentary elections. In a democratic regime, such a step is perfectly legitimate; it is a proven method of arriving at a new parliamentary majority, and it may have a successful application in our couuntry, too.

The path to early parliamentary elections can lead either through a decision made by the deputies in parliament, or through a referendum on early elections. Personally, I am convinced that there is still enough time to decide this matter in parliament, on the basis of a sensible compromise.

We should not forget, however, that even a referendum will not make it possible to hold the elections any earlier than some time in the fall. [passage omitted]

The issue of national minorities, the Hungarian national minority in particular, has been at the forefront of attention practically from the very beginning of the great political changes in our country. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic provides guarantees to members of national minorities, who are equal citizens of our state, regarding all rights and liberties and the rights connected with their belonging to a minority in particular. [passage omitted]

I believe that we will promptly fulfill our pledges given on the occasion of our state's admission to the Council of Europe. I am convinced that such issues as the language used for names and the currency, or spelling local names in the language of the nationality living there, should be concluded as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

We cannot ignore the position of those Slovaks who live in ethnically mixed areas—above all, in southern Slovakia—and who are in a minority. I have received a number of communications stating that, within such an ethnically isolated environment, our citizens feel isolated and abandoned, their own state is not looking after them adequately, and, in their own country, they do not feel at home. I consider this situation unacceptable, and it is necessary to say quite clearly that responsibility here belongs to the state bodies of our Republic and to no one else.

The Slovak state must guarantee all human and civic rights for all citizens on the state's territory, including Slovaks living in an ethnic minority anywhere in Slovakia. These Slovaks, too, must enjoy the state's guarantee that they can consider any place in this Republic their homeland.

The problem of the Romany nationality, or rather the Romany ethnic group, has some particular characteristics. It is well known that, in the case of the Romanies, the ethnic and cultural issues are dominated by very serious social problems. Over the past 10 years, the

government has tried various social experiments concerning the Romanies, but the results have not satisfied anyone. At the moment, the Romanies frequently become the first victims of the rising unemployment, and their social situation is beginning to show signs of further dramatic complications, a fact that is reflected in their state of health, too. [passage omitted]

In assessing last year's economic developments, we note that the pessimistic expectations of a collapse of the Slovak economy have not materialized. [passage omitted]

A closer analysis of the processes determining macroeconomic development reveals, however, a number of negative trends. First of all, the structural adaptation of our economy has been slow. In the course of the transformation process, production in sectors with a higher degree of added value recorded a considerable drop. The manufacturing sectors involved have not managed to compensate for the drop in domestic demand and in demand in the former Eastern markets by higher exports based on more exacting criteria.

Both the volume and number of investment projects have also been on the decrease. As an illustration: Since 1990, the volume of investments has dropped by 20 percent when price increases are taken into account. This further aggravates the technical and technological backwardness of the Slovak economy in comparison with foreign competitors, which in turn makes further significant positive structural movement impossible.

The worst manifestations of our economy's problems have been experienced in the development of the foreign trade balance and the state budget. In 1993, the state budget deficit was the most negative economic indicator. Its size was influenced by a number of factors, but the main cause must be seen to be in the objectively low performance of the Slovak economy. The current economic performance is too poor to create adequate means for the state to pay for services, even at the level to which citizens were accustomed. It also makes the financing of public investment projects impossible and does not leave enough resources for the further development of the private sector.

In 1993, our foreign trade ended up with a negative balance to the tune of 26 billion Slovak korunas. This goes to show that the export performance of our economy is not yet good enough to generate foreign currency levels sufficient to cover Slovakia's import needs. [passage omitted]

If a more pronounced contribution is to be made by foreign capital, we must make sure that the world finds in us a reliable partner. But I am afraid—and this has been confirmed by my talks with foreign representatives—that we have not sent out the right signals regarding this issue. [passage omitted]

The fact that, when we compare 1993 with 1992 we see an absolute drop in the volume of foreign investment in Slovakia, serves as a serious warning. [passage omitted]

For some time, the issue of internal security in our country has been attracting particular attention as well as causing considerable concern. Citizens are particularly sensitive to this problem because guarantees of personal security and the security of property belong to the foremost tasks of every state.

The growth of crime concerning property, which accounts for more than three-quarters of the total volume of crime committed, is alarming. The brutality of the crime committed, as well as the ever-lower age of young delinquents, is also causing concern. True, crime is concentrated mainly in large urban areas, but the sense of personal danger is beginning to be widespread.

The growth of corruption, which also affects state offices and banks, is also a worrying phenomenon. We must do all we can to prevent Slovakia at every level—from the highest offices down—from becoming a country of mafia gangs and corrupt officials.

I am mentioning these issues because, so far, these things have been only whispered, even in front of me. Instead, using thorough evidence, the issue should be dealt with openly and very specifically. The gradual elimination of the causes and factors contributing to the high level of crime therefore belongs to one of our fundamental tasks. On the one hand, the bodies of legal protection must get our wholehearted support, and, on the other, it is necessary to deepen social control over their activity because they must act within the limits defined by our Constitution and the law of our Republic.

Similarly, it is necessary to nourish the legal awareness of our citizens because the relatively low legal awareness in society makes a considerable contribution to the current poor state in law observance.

In the sphere of external security, we follow a singular orientation toward NATO and the Western European Union. Some citizens have written to me asking whether we are doing the right thing when, soon after doing away with one military alliance, we are showing interest in close cooperation with another, and whether this is being done for opportunistic reasons—that is, joining the stronger side.

True, such questions are atypical, but I would like to answer them nonetheless. Modern European cooperation means, above all, the utilization of all of the proven structures operating in Europe—and NATO, too, belongs to Europe. Our interest in cooperation with this group is therefore a part of our interest in a fully fledged integration of our sovereign state, with arrangements reflecting basic values. We have no enemies and no one endangers our state. We are convinced of the need for close cooperation with NATO not because of fears but because of the recognition of the fact that it is essential that we create a reliable security system around us.

The further we are from the memorable November 1989, the more apparent it is that the chronic economic crisis, and also the repeated crisis phenomena in political life, are a part of deeper processes that affected the countries of the Soviet bloc after its disintegration. In the rapid developmental process, the accepted principles and mechanisms of the social life of advanced Western countries were being inorganically linked to the prevailing mechanisms, habits, and overall mentality of the totalitarian era.

As a result of this, below-standard and hybrid conditions of life came into being in the countries of Central and East Europe, which, in a certain sense, also surprised Western experts and politicians. They called this hitherto unknown and, in its own way, incomprehensible fact postcommunism. In its substance, it remains the continuing version of state society, where the material and spiritual sources of dynamism have been exhausted.

Our public life now is portrayed by permanent political struggle. Its accompanying signs often are random verbal attacks, mutual accusations, various half-truths, and even downright lies and deviousness, which have only one aim: to discredit the political opponent.

Our internal political scene ceases to be a place where there is a constructive exchange of views, a search for common ways out of a complicated situation. It is changing into an arena with a number of duels leading nowhere, in which many lose their judgment, their own face and character. Zealous fighters for their own truth often put their own interests above the needs of the state. They do not see or do not want to see the difficulties to which Slovakia is being led by the confrontational line they nurture.

Unfortunately, we are witnessing how the nervousness of the political parties is increasingly being transferred to the citizens. On the other hand, it causes apathy toward internal political events, disenchantment, and mistrust of politicians. [passage omitted]

Today we are not only facing the task of definitively breaking away from the practices of the pre-November regimes, but we must also carry out the vitally important maneuver of dissociating our country from postcommunism. This objective can be achieved only if we rely on the broadest basis of social change, newly awakened citizenship. [passage omitted]

I propose that the National Council, the government, and the president's office nominate their own specialists to a group of responsible people who would set up a committee for dealing with questions of the strategic development of Slovakia [vybor pre otazky strategickeho rozvoja Slovenska]. The committee's task would be to ensure, in the organizational and conceptual sense and on the principles of the [word indistinct] system, the preparation of the necessary concept of modernization.

At the same time, I appeal to banking circles and nonstate organizations to support this entire project as much as they can.

I am turning to you, deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, chairmen of committees and groups of deputies, leading officials of political parties and movements, representatives of the state authorities, leading officials of the state administration, and elected representatives of towns and village governments; I am turning to all of the citizens of the Slovak Republic who have the fate of their homeland at heart:

Let us stop seeing one another as enemies only because we have different views. Let us not seek only mistakes in one another. Let us not argue about trifles that are being uselessly blown up by some politicians at speakers' tribunes. This is a path that leads us to the brink of an abyss and might destroy us. Let us seek conciliation—political, national, and civic. Let us remember that the citizens of the Slovak Republic are partners, that they live in a common country, and that is why they must jointly bear all of the successes and losses of life. Let us seek paths to one another. Let us not give up, let us work on ourselves and our work.

Our joint success and the success of our country will be our reward. It is in the name of these ideals, esteemed deputies, that I decided to adopt a standpoint in the next part of my address on serious questions concerning our internal political situation. [passage omitted]

Many point to the autocratic way of the prime minister's governing. Whoever voices a different view or a different standpoint is gradually disloyal, lacking solidarity, and, in the end, becomes a traitor.

The conflict in the government, unfortunately, was transferred to the entire society. I get letters from citizens in which they express dissatisfaction with the fact that relations between the president of the Slovak Republic and the prime minister are not good. Some citizens blame me for being against the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], that I do not support the government and its prime minister.

Before explaining the situation and the causes of our tense relationship, I should like to say that I have not been and I am not against the HZDS and I have not been and I am not against the government. However, I have serious reservations about the style and ethics of Mr. Meciar's policies, about the way he conducts government and about the practices that create a confrontational atmosphere in political life. [applause]

The prime minister, since a certain time when he found out that I wanted to perform the presidential role in an assertive way, in the spirit of the Constitution, gradually started to ignore me, questioning my work and, gradually, he started to blame and discredit me so much that I thought it was designed to lead toward my being prematurely removed from the post of president.

I want to assure you in this connection that I never did anything against the prime minister. I only defended the autonomy and independence of the president of the Slovak Republic as the official head of state. [passage omitted]

You may well remember that, during my first visit to parliament after being elected president on 27 October 1993, there was no one from the government present in this room; today there are at least a few ministers here. [applause] The public understand it as a loss of esteem for the office of the president. You also certainly noticed how protocol is being infringed when the president is on official visits abroad and when he returns. The prime minister and often the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [parliament] ignore the state ceremonial, which is normal practice all over the world. [passage omitted]

The HZDS accused me of surrounding myself with people who were against the birth of the Slovak Republic, that I was setting up a new government, that some people from my office took part in secret talks in Prague on the possible setting up of a new Slovak Government, that I ganged up with the opposition, with representatives of the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia, even that I have been bought from abroad.

Following my New Year's address, the prime minister accused me of destabilizing the HZDS and the government of the Slovak Republic.

I resolutely and totally reject these and other accusations as being misconstrued and untrue. The main culprit in our internal political instability and unfortunate situation is not the president.

Allow me now to recall some events that characterize the way they behave toward me:

On 28 February, with Mr. Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, present, I told the prime minister of my decision to accept the resignation of Mr. Roman Kovac and Mr. Jozef Moravcik, provided I do not accept the proposal to fill the post of the minister of foreign affairs with Mr. Prokes. [passage omitted] Then I was asked by the prime minister whether it was true that I intended to invite the heads of districts to talks. I explained to him that I intended to visit some districts personally. I wanted to invite to Bratislava those whom I did not visit. The prime minister did not agree with this, claiming that I had no business to invite the heads of the district offices. He said that, wherever I went, I created the impression of being an enemy. He threatened that the heads who accept my invitation will be immediately sacked by him. After that, he accused me of being responsible for the current internal political situation.

I will not engage in deep analysis of the prime minister's viewpoint to the prepared visit of heads of district offices now. I only note that I must assess it as an unheard-of limitation of the constitutional rights of the head of state. [applause] [passage omitted]

So far, there have been only two meetings at which the prime minister briefed me on government sessions. It was not my fault. I waited for him many Tuesdays in vain, but the prime minister did not even bother to announce that he would not come. The prime minister also accused me of causing decay, while he was striving to unite and harmonize everything. The prime minister got the expected response from the audience for this misleading accusation against the president, accompanied by exclamations such as: Recall the president, and other offensive statements. [passage omitted]

The view of the foreign partner is an important factor in assessing the success or otherwise of the president's foreign trips. I can assure you that I know the assessment of my foreign trips at least as well as the prime minister, and, what is more, I have it directly from competent foreign personalities. I can state with full responsibility that their official assessments, including those on the talks with President Clinton and the visit to Poland, have been positive.

But why should anyone want to cast doubt on these objective facts? Particularly because, personally, I am pleased at every success achieved by the prime minister or by the speaker of the Slovak parliament—in fact, everyone who represents our Republic abroad.

I have always recognized and appreciated some particular abilities of Mr. Meciar: his industriousness, enthusiasm, brilliant memory, quick response, vehemence, above-average rhetoric, and ability to maneuver. I have no intention of questioning these abilities now. At the same time, however, I have had to accept many reservations pointing to his negative qualities, which must be mitigated so that his abilities might be used for the good of our society. [passage omitted]

The prime minister is not willing to cooperate as a partner and to conduct a correct dialogue. He cannot unite the varied groupings of citizens and amplify the political energy of the state. In view of his suspiciousness, he is capable of cooperating only with the people who are in some way obligated to him. Mr. Meciar does not need advisers, cocreators, and opponents, but only helpers in implementing his intentions. [passage omitted]

It is a pity that the prime minister is not here, but I do turn to him: I ask you, prime minister, for the sake of the good name of Slovakia, for the sake of democracy; think, without anger and hatred in your heart, about all that I have said here. Remember that Slovakia also belongs to different-thinking Slovaks and all of our citizens, that they have the right to their views, to their convictions. [applause]

But I ask that this sincere attempt and appeal of mine might not be explained as a weakness. All those who

think that the president of the Republic can be intimidated are wrong. [applause] So are those who think that he can be discouraged from fulfilling his duties, which he festively undertook to fulfill.

The president will remain in the service of the people, of the citizens of the Republic until the end. He will remain faithful to the promise that he will see to the well-being of the Slovak people, national minorities, and ethnic groups, that he will observe and defend the Constitution and other laws.

Michal Kovac, president of the Slovak Republic, will never betray the Slovak Republic, his people, or his reason and conscience, even if he has to drink the bitter cup to the dregs. [applause]

I do not know how to hate anyone. I do not want to engage in intrigues against anyone, and I am determined ato responsibly fulfill all of the duties and use all of the rights of the president.

Esteemed deputies, in November 1989 we promised one another that we would speak the truth, that we would try to call things by their right names, that heads would not roll any longer, that we would be tolerant and decent, and that the bearing of grudges and hatred would come to an end.

In the spirit of these ideals, I am not asking Mr. Meciar to resign. But I appeal to all of you, including the prime minister, to unite forces and take steps that will start a stage of political, national, and civic reconciliation. I appeal to everyone to stop attacking one another, accusing one another, dishonoring one's opponents, and escalating the tension in society. Let us help everyone to help create a peaceful atmosphere for the early parliamentary elections and let the citizens decide about us.

We always have the chance to sit down together and agree on the rules and conditions for political, national, and civic conciliation in the interest of Slovakia and its citizens.

Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Cabinet: Speech 'Outrageous Attack'

LD0903211794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] The Cabinet of the Slovak Republic has held an extraordinary session to discuss the president's address at the National Council. The Cabinet adopted a statement expressing its great alarm and distress regarding the president's speech, which it considers to be an outrageous attack on the fundamental institutions of our young state that have been formed on the basis of democratic elections; the attack damages the name and status of the Slovak Republic abroad and significantly destabilizes the internal political situation, which is already rather complex.

The Cabinet on principle rejects the president's speech as confrontational and unprecedented, contradicting European political standards and human ethics and going beyond the constitutional powers of the president of the Republic, even more so because this Cabinet deserves credit for the formation of the independent and sovereign Slovak Republic and bears main responsibility for its development.

The Cabinet will submit the speech by the president of the Republic to a thorough analysis and will inform the citizens about its outcome.

Deputy Proposes No-Confidence Vote in Meciar

LD0903183794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] [Announcer] Shortly before 1800 hours, Deputy Ladislav Pittner [Christian Democratic Movement] submitted the following proposal in parliament:

[Begin Pittner recording] I am submitting a proposal for a vote of no confidence in Vladimir Meciar, the prime minister of the Slovak Republic.

Vladimir Meciar, as prime minister of the Slovak Republic, has led the Slovak Republic into a political and economic crisis. By his statements, attitudes, and decisions, he has diminished the credibility of the Slovak Republic abroad; by the methods of his political work, on a long-term basis, he was unable to win over sufficient support within the minority government and in the Slovak Republic National Council. He was incapable of maintaining acceptable relations with the other supreme bodies of the state, in particular with the Slovak Republic National Council and president.

It is for this reason that, in harmony with the Slovak Republic Constitution, I submit this proposal, together with the list of signatures of the necessary number of deputies, to the Slovak Republic National Council, asking for this proposal to be discussed. [end recording]

[Announcer] The parliament will vote on Ladislav Pittner's proposal in a short while.

Vote Scheduled for 10 Mar

LD0903185194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] At this moment, everything has been decided. Chairman Ivan Gasparovic has ended today's session. The parliament will deal with Deputy Ladislav Pittner's proposal to pass a vote of no confidence in the government of Vladimir Meciar tomorrow morning [10 March] in a secret ballot.

This is all from the parliament for today.

Meciar Rejects Broad Coalition Government Notion

LD0903194394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] The cross-party standing committee of all Slovak parliamentary parties met today shortly before 1700. President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar were also present. Peter Weiss, the parliament's deputy speaker, has informed us about the meeting's results:

[Begin Weiss recording] The cross-party standing committee has met on my initiative. I based it on the final part of the president's speech on the need to seek ways toward national and political conciliation, healing political wounds, easing the atmosphere of confrontation, and creating peaceful conditions for early elections.

On the basis of this initiative, a meeting was held in the presence of both the president and the prime minister. Representatives of all parliamentary parties and movements were there. Various proposals were presented there for the creation of a broad coalition government—also by the president and myself.

It must be said that the prime minister explicitly rejected the idea of a broad coalition government until early elections are held. The atmosphere that arose there was more likely to lead to a new confrontation than to a constructive dialogue. That is, the prime minister showed unwillingness to seek a solution that would be generally acceptable. [end recording]

Refuses To Address Parliament

LD0903201694 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] [Announcer] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar took his place in parliament today during the discussion of Deputy Pittner's proposal to take a vote of no confidence in the Slovak Republic Government.

Pavol Kanis, from the Party of the Democratic Left, asked the prime minister to address parliament.

[Begin Meciar recording] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, esteemed Mr. Speaker. I am pleased to take the opportunity given to me by parliament to speak. This did not use to be the habit in these rooms in the past.

I have, however, been unable to acquaint myself with the speech by the president. I was receiving the World Jewish Congress's delegation during his address. There is no written record (?of his speech). The government members were acquainted with the speech. I was, unfortunately, present at the discussion (?here in the back of this hall), and, hence, I missed the government session. I do not even have the papers that the government has. I would consider it an honor to speak about these matters tomorrow. But do not ask me to speak today. I am not familiar with the issue on which I am to express an opinion. [end recording]

[Announcer] We are ready to broadcast the prime minister's speech in a live relay on ST2 tomorrow. [passage omitted]

SNS Offers To Withdraw From Coalition

LD0903231094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota told a TASR correspondent that his party had suggested to the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] chairman that it would withdraw from the coalition with the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] if it was inevitable in order to form an HZDS-SDL coalition before early parliamentary elections. He said that the SNS was aware that the problem that has arisen was not a result of politicking but of the economic collapse of this young republic.

SDL Chairman Peter Weiss reacted to Slota's offer to withdraw from the coalition with the following words: We are willing to negotiate with anyone, but today, after the president's speech, the situation is different from what it was yesterday.

Asked whether the SDL was united, Weiss responded that four deputies had not signed the proposal to dismiss the prime minister because they insisted that the issue of early elections should be resolved first. He added that the current crisis in the country could not be resolved by passing a vote of no confidence in Vladimir Meciar without agreeing on a date for early elections.

HZDS Parliament Group Deputy Chairman Resigns

LD0903201594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Imrich Mo:i, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia parliamentary group, has confirmed to the press agency [as heard] that he resigned from his post at yesterday's session of the parliamentary group. The reason for the decision is his fundamental disagreement with the formulation of the second question of the referendum, which concerns the withdrawal of deputies' mandate.

New Democratic Party Deputy Chairmen Listed

AU0903134194 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 7 Mar 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "After the Democratic Party's Constituent Congress"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—"We have succeeded in uniting within a year what could be united on the right of the political spectrum, and we can offer the voters a real

political force," said old-new Democratic Party (DS) Chairman Pavol Hagyari at a press briefing held yesterday after the party's constituent congress. [passage omitted]

Apart from the chairman, the delegates to the congress elected five DS deputy chairmen—Ivan Miklos, Miroslav Ondrus, Stefan Hanigovsky, Vladimir Duchon' and Igor Bartl. They also amended the party's program and articles. [passage omitted]

Belgian Senators Focus on Hungarian Minority

LD0803191894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] After yesterday's talks in Bratislava with Slovak Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak, senators of the Kingdom of Belgium who are here at his invitation, visited southern Slovakia today. Peter Rohac has more to say about their agenda today.

[Rohac] [passage omitted] Although both senators are experts in defense and foreign policy, they also have great experience in the working of autonomy and coexistence between citizens of different ethnic backgrounds from their own country. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, Peter (Baby), a deputy for the municipal council, expressed the view that the local Hungarians, although Slovak Republic citizens, belonged to the Hungarian nation, which was artificially divided.

He alleged that the present Slovak state power was trying to assimilate the Hungarians rather than integrate them into a unified Slovak Republic. Our other state administration representatives reacted against this opposition standpoint. Senator Nestor Hubert Pecriaux, who is a member of the Council of Europe, remarked that they knew about the Hungarian political parties' complaints, but there was no need to dramatize the ethnic minority problem. On the basis of their experience here [in Slovakia], he thought that all who wanted to coexist could prove that this was possible. It is apparently clear that all of the European communities have a different approach to these questions, and it is logical that everybody has the right to organize himself according to how he feels, but, on one condition, and that is that all voters and citizens are satisfied. [passage omitted]

Alleged KGB Return to Slovakia Protested

94P20477A Kosice SLOVENSKY VYCHOD in Slovak 26 Feb pp 1-2

[Letter to the Editor by Vladimir Palko, Jozef Klein, Juraj Kohutiar, Pavol Katreniak, and Vladislav Chlipala: "Is There a KGB Threat?"]

[Text] Yesterday, the editor received the text of a statement by top functionaries of the former Federal Security and Information Service (FBIS), in which they respond to the implications of a visit to Bratislava by the head of the Russian Foreign Secret Service.

"Reports in the [Slovak] media covering the visit of J. Primakov, director of Russia's Foreign Secret Service, reveal that our intelligence service has 'its man in the Russian service and, vice versa, the Russians have their man in SIS [Slovak Information Service].' Thus, four years after the day on which the CSFR Interior Minister, Jan Langos, legally suspended KGB activities on CSFR territory by canceling an agreement with the KGB, we are again witnessing the legalization of activity by members of the present Russian secret service on Slovak territory.

"The Russian secret service is a direct successor to the First KGB Directorate and, from the personnel standpoint, is practically identical with it. Even if one takes into account the need for exchanging certain kinds of information between the Slovak information service and foreign information services—the Russian one included—we still consider that the presence of a representative of the Russian service in SIS amounts to a breach of the stated goals of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy. In view of the philosophy and practices of the Russian intelligence service, we feel that collaboration of the proposed sort disqualifies us from participation in wider cooperation with the special services of other democratic countries and, in conjunction with other factors, practically predetermines Slovakia's orientation toward the East. Neither can the proclaimed reason for this kind of close cooperation—fight against Russian and Chechen mafias—pass muster because these targets are not included in the Russian Federation law on foreign intelligence."

Signed: Vladimir Palko, former FBIS First Deputy Director; Jozef Klein, former Director, FBIS Office, Bratislava; Juraj Kohutiar, former Deputy Director, FBIS Office, Bratislava; Pavol Katreniak, former Director, FBIS Office, Banska Bystrica; Vladislav Chlipala, former Director, FBIS Office, Kosice.

Soldiers' Association Opposes Ministry Decision

AU0903134994 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 7 Mar 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "A False Claim, To Say the Least"]

[Text] Bratislava—At its meeting in Zilina on Saturday [5 March], the Association of Slovak Soldiers (ASV) Presidium discussed the reasons cited by Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak when he expressed his disagreement with the signing of an agreement on cooperation between the ASV and the Defense Ministry. It considers his claim about the Association's almost illegal conduct to be, to say the least, false. This statement is contained in a letter handed to TA SR by ASV Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Stegena.

According to the letter, the ASV Presidium has weighed the reasons and circumstances associated with them for the planned nationwide commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the repulsion of Hungarian aggression in March 1939 and, after taking all of them into consideration, especially the organizational requirements, has decided to hold the event on 26 March.

Government 'Very Satisfied' With Brussels Talks

LD0803232094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Excerpts] There was a slight hitch in the agenda in Brussels, Gyorgy Foris reports:

[Foris] It created a general surprise in Brussels that, at the last minute, the meeting of the European Union's troika and the six Eastern European countries that had already signed the association agreement—Hungary included—was cancelled or, rather, postponed. The reason for the delay is the non-stop negotiation with Norway on admission. [passage omitted]

The Czech foreign minister's answer to all this was to propose the cancellation of the meeting altogether and to fix a new date in a few weeks. The parties finally agreed to it and parted. In the meantime, the bargaining over Norway's membership is still under way.

Opinions regarding the evaluation of these events are, to say the least, divided. The official Hungarian position—according to Gyorgy Granasztoi, Hungarian ambassador in Brussels—is that we understand the difficulties faced by the European Union and the Greek presidium. After all, the European Union is currently experiencing crucial hours these days.

Anyway, according to Hungarian evaluations, we are very satisfied with the results achieved during the past two days, and the Hungarian delegation considers its trip to Brussels successful. [passage omitted]

'Certain Countries' Backsliding on Minority Rights

LD0803205794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Istvan Kulcsar reports on the foreign affairs spokesman's regular press briefing today.

[Kulcsar] [Passage omitted] At the news conference Foreign Affairs Spokesman Janos Herman took several questions regarding the foreign ministers' meeting of the Central European Initiative in Trieste last weekend. He replied:

[Begin Herman recording] At the foreign ministers' consultation, it could be detected that certain countries were backing out from handling the national minority issue. A proposal had been made earlier—and every country of the organization agreed with this proposal in the initial stages—to work out a document about the protection of national minority rights. The original idea was to ratify the document at a special foreign ministerial conference to be convened in Hungary. The attitude of Slovakia and the Czech Republic is currently less favorable than that of the former Czechoslovakia had been.

Nevertheless, preparations of the document on the protection of national minority rights are continuing. The national coordinators will meet again in the near future, and we hope that this new consultation will produce progress in the formulation of the document. [end recording]

Law Adopted on Vetting Leading Officials

LD0803204694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Text] The Hungarian parliament has passed the agent bill, which stipulates vetting the past of important officials. According to the law—which was passed with 177 votes for, 12 against, and 50 abstentions—parliamentary deputies, government members, the heads of the National Bank of Hungary, and the mayor of Budapest will have to be vetted in future. The past of ambassadors, military and police heads, the top officials and editors of Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, MTI, and newspapers with a circulation of more than 30,000 will also have to be checked.

SZDSZ Leader Comments

LD0903234794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Studio interview with SZDSZ Deputy Imre Mecs by unidentified announcer; date not given —live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] I welcome Imre Mecs, deputy of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], who is also a member of the parliament's National Security Committee. According to the new so-called Agents' Law [adopted on 8 March], the parliament's National Security Committee will have to select three judges whose duty will be to screen citizens.

Let us start with the most interesting aspect of the law: It is backdated to 1 January 1994 and will be in force untill 30 June 2000. The relevant documents are closed to inspection until the year 2030. Well, this puts the whole affair in a different light. [passage omitted]

[Mecs] [Passage omitted] Back in the autumn of 1990, right at the beginning of the parliament's tenure, Gabor Demszky, then deputy, and Peter Hack, an excellent lawyer, submitted an excellent bill, which could have settled the matter. The government parties voted down the proposal, it was not even put up for debate in the parliament.

Then the government submitted several times a less well thought out and less clear bill that went on and on. Prime Minister Peter Boross participated in the debate of the bill in various capacities—as a minister without portfolio supervising the secret services, and later as interior minister, and finally as prime minister—and every time he voiced his doubts.

So, perhaps the kind of behavior that characterizes this matter is hypocrisy. On the one hand, they were pushing

the propaganda for this bill, on the other, the government and the government parties did everything in their power to see that this law should not be adopted until the end of this parliament's tenure.

And here it is: The parliament adopted a law for the next parliament in the 11th hour, without sufficient preparation, and with the hastily thought out proposed amendments of the Constitutional Committee. And this is morally very objectionable behavior, and on behalf of my party I dissociate myself from it. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] However, you personally will have to search for the judges who will carry out the task of screening. [Passage omitted] What does not come to light from the Agents' Law is how far the investigation goes back into the past. For example, there are questions about whether or not someone was a member of the Arrow-Cross Party. So how far are we going back—40, 50 years? [Mecs] [Passage omitted] It is rather a matter of principle. However, the law, in its opening paragraphs, lists the predecessor organizations it applies to and the PRO [Political Police Department—Politikai Rendeszeti Osztaly] that was formed in February 1945, and thus its agent network and officer corps fall under the law. [passage omitted]

However, on the basis of various considerations, the government confined the terms of the law to the activities and employees of the III/3 Department [reference to the Interior Ministry's secret police group during the communist regime] and its predecessors. Thus, the informers who worked for the Army or the military police are exempt, and so are those who were planted in the emigration abroad and who caused immense damage. [passage omitted]

However, an even bigger problem is that, in effect, the implementation of the law will fail because, at the last minute, the National Assembly's Constitutional Committee smuggled into the law a provision that covers the editors and editor in chiefs of privately-owned papers with a circulation exceeding 30,000. This, we think, is unconstitutional on several counts. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] [Passage omitted] Do you think that the reporting of suspected former agents by members of the public will now become a fashion? [passage omitted]

[Mecs] It is very difficult to make reports like this because those in the know are former staff in the Interior Ministry, the officers of the III/3 Department, and a few leading former politicians. [passage omitted] However, there is no defense against slanderous accusations because the amendment that intended to create the possibility for any citizen to ask for a vetting against himself was rejected by the National Assembly. I fear that there will be many sly slanderous charges and people will not be able to clear themselves. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Are you sure that the documents of the reports survived? Some people doubt that the documents are authentic. We know that around the change of the regime there were cleansing and paper laundering at various departments. [passage omitted]

[Mecs] [Passage omitted] Indeed, very many papers were destroyed but even more survived. The staff of Istvan Horvath, did not select properly, but panicked and had all sorts of things destroyed. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Did you expect, when debating the law, that people would confess voluntarily? [passage omitted]

[Mecs] Look, this law is not, in effect, a penal law, it only exerts pressure on somebody to resign. He, who—as a result of pressure regrettably became involved into the secret service and has since purified himself, having gone through a catharsis—is a valuable person who is acceptable to society. [passage omitted]

Csurka Views Vetting

AU0903150094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, by Pal Szombathy in the parliament on 8 March: "The Agents Law Is Merely a 'Powder Law'"]

[Text] *I am glad I vetted myself earlier, and I voted in favor of this cosmetic law in order to prove that this thing no longer interests me—Istvan Csurka told MAGYAR HIRLAP after the parliamentary vote of the so-called "agents law." Istvan Csurka, the cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], who uncovered his recruitment as an informer prior to his expulsion from the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], also complained that the parliament failed to extend the memorial day of Nazi victims to the victims of Bolshevism.*

[Szombathy] What position did you and the MIEP group take at the vote on the agents law?

[Csurka] We voted yes, so we accepted the proposal. Our parliamentary group coordinated its stand prior to the vote and all of us tried to participate in the vote in order to emphasize our position. However, Janos Denes was so shocked at the previous vote (on the memorial day of the Nazi victims) that he was no longer able to wait for this vote too. I understand his indignation, because the entire legislative process is becoming ridiculous.

[Szombathy] Why did you decide to support the agents law?

[Csurka] Actually, this has never been questionable for us. We would have liked to adopt a serious law, but our strength is still to limited for that. The law is not an agent law, but an irresponsible "cosmetic law." The law on former informers will have no positive consequences on the Hungarian public whatsoever, because the law continues to leave the real agents unnamed and unpunished.

[Szombathy] If this is your opinion about the law, why did you support it?

[Csurka] It is better than nothing. We could not allow ourselves to be accused that precisely the MIEP was not voting in favor of the law, when we exclude every communist element from our activity.

[Szombathy] In your opinion, why is this law incapable of fulfilling its real function?

[Csurka] It does not have power, and it does not contain restrictions, punishments, and sanctions, like other laws. It makes the procedure extremely lax, and it does not cover the entire public life, and it is extremely lenient toward the old regime and party machinery.

[Szombathy] Why did you not try to make the bill stricter with various modification proposals?

[Csurka] We submitted modification proposals, but the miserable results of the vote preceding the agents law proves the extent to which such MIEP efforts were swept away. For example, we earlier demanded the replacement of the chief prosecutor. We are alone when we want to modify a law in order to condemn communism and the old regime. It is interesting that, yesterday too, there were 57 of us who wanted the memorial day of Nazi victims to be extended to the victims of Bolshevism. In our view, Nazism and Bolshevism are totally identical concepts. However, our parliament absolves Bolshevism and condemns Nazism. One victim should not be more sympathetic than the other one. In addition, I think the law on creating a memorial day is slightly dangerous because talks are now being held between certain Jewish organizations and the government on compensating the Jews and settling the damages incurred to them, and now the representatives of full compensation have received a big moral push with this law. Unfortunately, the parliament failed to sense that circumstance. This parliament is definitely ripe to step down.

[Szombathy] To what extent does your own case influence you when you voice your criticism? Certain things became known about this before your departure from the MDF....

[Csurka] Those were difficult days, but I can only say that I am glad that I vetted myself and accepted the things that can be used against me. It is both an honest and Christian thing to remain alone on the pedestal, although I do not feel guilty at all. They cannot bring anything against me by which I caused any damage to anyone; I never submitted any report.

[Szombathy] Starting from your own case, what advice can you give to those affected by the law?

[Csurka] I do not deal with it, and I will not answer that question. I have nothing to do with them.

Additional Troops May Be Sent to Croatia

LD1003143394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Jan Woroniecki, head of the UN Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has denied a PAP report that Poland has decided to send 150 soldiers from the peacekeeping force to the former Yugoslavia. He explained that Poland has been considering sending additional troops but only to Croatia, where the Polish battalion has already been posted. The UN general secretary has called for the strengthening of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sejm Rejects Discussion of Zhirinovskiy Visit

LD1003103394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0835 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Mar—The Sejm, which is deliberating today, has rejected a motion by the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] parliamentary group for adding to the agenda a report by the foreign minister on actions taken by the government to prevent any public insults of the Polish Republic and its bodies by foreigners.

Justifying the motion, the KPN recalled that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is to come to Poland soon and asked whether the government had taken any actions to stop the visit. The motion was supported by 118 deputies; 133 voted against and 69 abstained.

Next, the Sejm approved a motion by Deputy Bogdan Pek to discuss the government's report on the privatization of Bank Slaski as the first item on the agenda.

Coalition Discusses Finance Minister Candidate

WS0903130994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by E.Cz., M.U., and J.B.L.: "Pawlak-Rosati Meeting on Saturday"]

[Text] On Saturday [12 March], Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak will meet with Dariusz Rosati, candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. Only after this meeting will he make a final decision concerning his appointment. Upon his return from India, President Lech Walesa said at the airport that he had not been consulted concerning Rosati's candidacy and that he does not know him. The SLD insists upon appointing Rosati as quickly as possible; the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has not submitted any objections and has left the decision to the prime minister.

Yesterday's meeting of the coalition leadership at the Parkowa Hotel lasted only two hours. Jerzy Szmajdzinski, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, did not conceal after the meeting that the SLD would like Dariusz Rosati to be appointed to the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister as soon as possible. "The prime minister is, by his nature, a tight-lipped man, and he is not willing to express his opinions," replied Szmajdzinski, when asked about the prime minister's opinion on the candidacy of Rosati. The prime minister has put off making a final decision until after his meeting with the candidate, for which "he reserved a lot of time." Dariusz Rosati told us on the night of 8 March that he has an appointment to hold such a long meeting with the prime minister on Saturday and that he has so far only spoken with him twice on the phone.

Also discussed at the evening meeting was the announcement by National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk that he will submit an objection in the Constitutional Tribunal to the provisions of the Budget Law, which obliges the Ministry of National Defense to purchase equipment from Polish factories, including Mielec.

We hope, Szmajdzinski said on behalf of the SLD, that Minister Kolodziejczyk will be able to fully present his stance in the Senate. We get the impression that it is not all that clear. The Senate should hold a satisfactory discussion of the budget. In the Senate, Kolodziejczyk is supposed to take the floor on behalf of the government, not the ministry.

It was agreed that, after the government forwards the law on ratification of the Concordat to the Sejm, it will be necessary for parliamentary clubs to discuss the procedures, pace, and time of the first reading of this law.

The coalition members declared on behalf of the government that they are ready to conduct talks with Solidarity and reach compromises.

The PSL deputies are "quietly waiting for new developments," said Franciszek J. Stefaniuk, deputy chairman of the club, before the meeting at Parkowa street. The PSL has not submitted any objections to the candidacy of Rosati and left the final decision to the prime minister. Rosati's statement that he would continue the policy pursued by Borowski disturbs the peasants. "Why, we will not question the budget that we have ourselves passed," he says. "Rosati declares an honest privatization policy, which is exactly what we want."

"I do not know him personally; however, from publications and opinions of the milieu, I know that he was critical of the Balcerowicz plan, which draws us closer to him. One can count on good cooperation with him," said Sejm Deputy Waldemar Michna (member of the Budget Committee).

Chief of Staff on Army Changes, Sejm Rapport

WS1003150094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, by Zbigniew Lentowicz; place and date

not given: "Our Strong Army; In 10 Years, Our Army Will Be Smaller but More Professional"]

[Text] [Lentowicz] Mr. General, you and your close associates from the General Staff, which is the chief organ for commanding the Armed Forces today, have been charged with personal responsibility for what the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic will be like in the future. What did you begin with?

[Wilecki] We deliberated very thoroughly the issue of our country's defense philosophy, alliances, and security systems, and, of course, we also used our national tradition as a basis. It is the General Staff's view that Poland needs an army consisting of conscripts and of professional military, with the length of the basic military service being of one-year duration in the future. As a general rule, our goal is to extend the popular duty of defense preparation to all citizens, and that goal is expressed in the draft of a future law on the popular defense duty.

[Lentowicz] Does it mean that you [General Staff] intend to cut down on the current list of possibilities for using postponements of military service again?

[Wilecki] We intend to reduce the list radically. It is obvious that some exceptions to the general rule of popular military service must be allowed for purely humanitarian reasons. But what is happening today proves that the law-making agencies that enacted the current provisions, in our view, committed a strategic error. Fifty percent of Polish youth manage to avoid military service for various reasons.

[Lentowicz] Professionalization is the other issue....

[Wilecki] We want to achieve a considerable degree of professionalization of the service. Therefore, we will have soldiers of a professional service, a contract service, and an over-the-time service. At the end of 1995, we should reach the level of 16,000-20,000 over-the-time soldiers. That would make it possible for us to assign experienced "experts" to the most modern combat equipment units.

When it comes to military units today, only every tenth person who would like to do so has the chance of remaining in the service longer—that is, for another two to four years.

When one looks at current price lists, about a trillion zlotys [Z] will have to be spent from the state budget for making all over-the-time contracts operational. By the end of June—that is, after the experiment is over—we will know how to go about creating an image of that kind of service and also how to provide financial incentives for people to serve there in the most unrewarding kinds of posts.

[Lentowicz] The Vienna treaties imposed an obligation on us to further cut down on the size of the Army, which now stands at 250,000. How many officers will simply be deprived of their jobs?

[Wilecki] Reaching a specific size of the Armed Forces (234,000) and also limitations regarding military equipment also largely determine the future of the internal structures in the Army. One had to come up with new, better, and more effective kinds of measures, and also to see to it that the necessary combat readiness of detachments and subdetachments be maintained during restructuring. As early as 1997, an organizational framework of the Armed Forces will be set up, with the Army's final form being reached in 10 years. We will then have a smaller Army but also a more professional one, and it will also have greater combat and maneuver possibilities. One cannot avoid cuts that will occur on the way to reaching that goal. We must give up the professional cadre, especially in the Army administration and in "logistical" support—that is, quartermaster, medical, and commissary services. Many posts currently occupied by officers will be taken over by ensigns and noncommissioned officers. We are approaching difficult transformations in the most rational manner possible. Reductions in officer surpluses are facilitated by a new law on retirement pensions, which makes it possible to leave the service sooner. Besides, the changes will be spread over many years.

[Lentowicz] So we do not face the danger of a rebellion by unwanted officers?

[Wilecki] I do not think we so. In the Polish Army, there is no problem with lack of discipline or insufficient subordination. The fact that currently there are 20,000 members of the cadre awaiting apartments or improvements in their housing conditions or that there are many military families whose members do not live together did not have an impact on the needs of the service, either. If only other state structures were in as good condition as the Army, I think our country's situation would be much better.

[Lentowicz] During the times of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Army was supposed to be a home front for Soviet fronts. Right now, getting rid of the asymmetrical dislocation of forces established at the time is a problem. What will change after "Wilecki's model" is implemented?

[Wilecki] The backbone of our Armed Forces is made up of land forces that in peace time are concentrated in four regions. The fact that they will be organized into corps-division-brigade structures will make these forces more mobile and also more easily maneuverable and logistically supplied. Air forces are another important element—these are supposed to perform the role of an umbrella for the Republic of Poland during peace time, and they are supposed to be a "shield and sword" in wartime. Unfortunately, that type of military unit costs a lot—supplying new missiles or aircraft means enormous expenditures.

[Lentowicz] And yet you began the process of strengthening air forces with cuts and reductions precisely in the area of aerial military units.

[Wilecki] As recently as a few years ago, we had almost 1,000 aircraft. Currently, in accordance with the Vienna agreements, we can have 460 at most, so it would be hard to imagine maintaining entire technical supply units or the elaborate services supporting the aerial equipment.

[Lentowicz] These days, no one any longer wants buildings and other items left behind by the Army, whereas the Army made a decision, for instance, to give up 20 of its airfields....

[Wilecki] We have addressed supreme authorities to prepare the territorial government administration to receive not only that part of the legacy. It would be a shame if the entire infrastructure were to go down the drain.

[Lentowicz] What is the current value of the so-called superfluous military property? Has anyone tried to calculate that at all?

[Wilecki] What we intend to transfer to the national economy this year and next is, according to our calculations, worth Z80-90 trillion. That comprises 10-15 percent of the entire military property: garrisons, airfields, and training fields' infrastructure. There are also serious problems. As late as a few years ago, local authorities were pressuring us to eliminate garrisons; they demanded an immediate transfer of military sites, and we defended ourselves. Today, the situation is different: Demands are being made that the Army be present in every small town, every gmina [small administrative units] and voivodship [administrative units].

[Lentowicz] Is there a fear? Of what?

[Wilecki] This is not just about anxiety. Apart from a certain stabilization and contributing to a sense of safety, an army is also a factor contributing to the establishment of new cities and towns. It creates "civilian" jobs, and, in small centers, it occupies a significant position on the market in terms of being a purchaser. However, we cannot afford to maintain a military infrastructure this huge. So we are gradually eliminating garrisons in the country's central regions. Last year, we completely eliminated 11 garrisons, five airfields, and seven testing grounds. This year, another 13 garrisons will be eliminated, including some with a substantive historical tradition. We must dissolve 25 garrisons in total and reduce the number of troops in many others.

[Lentowicz] Do the cadre, the officers in the units affected, have a clear vision of the future? Do they already know where they will be assigned next?

[Wilecki] The answer is yes with regard to a substantial proportion of units that are being established on the basis of the new structure, while the remaining officers will be learning about that in due course.

[Lentowicz] Do you not think that the youngest cadre, in particular—that is, officers dating back to the 1980's—who are largely the result of a negative selection, will be able to influence the cadre's quality shortly, and that they perhaps will fail to meet challenges a modern army creates?

[Wilecki] Every now and then I hear about this negative selection theory. I am hereby stating officially that there has never been any negative selection in the Army with regard to cadre selection. At least as far as I am concerned, I cannot agree with such statements. You can never tell whether a young man age 20 something will definitely become a general or whether he will burn himself out in the Army as a captain. An army is a tough school of life, and often we are not the ones who decide personally where to go next. During 30 years of service, I have already changed my residence 11 times.

[Lentowicz] And yet, many military, in accordance with the spirit of the time, are beginning to regard the Army not as a vocation but as a profession.

[Wilecki] I do not think there is anything wrong with that. But still, my experience is that I do not come across subordinates who tell me that they only work until 1500.... That is, I have not come across them from the time I first put on my uniform.

[Lentowicz] Army restructuring makes it imperative to make choices. So who will be treated preferentially in terms of jobs or finances?

[Wilecki] Reconnaissance and radioelectronic fight units are priorities, as well as commanding systems and those systems that secure the Army's functioning under combat conditions. We will enlarge the entire antiarmor branch and also the antiaircraft branch, the so-called small technologies. We are also concerned with building a popular defense system that would be based on territorial defenses, among others.

[Lentowicz] And a Krakow district will have new experiences in that field?

[Wilecki] A new military district of Krakow will be the experiment's main site. Within three to five years, we will test new corps-brigade structures in the district, as well as a model of land forces, where air forces would have a significant contribution. We intend to secure maximum aerial mobility and maneuverability of the troops in the region by equipping the units there, among others, with Polish-made helicopters produced by the Swidnik plant.

[Lentowicz] That is if appropriate finances can be found for that.

[Wilecki] The final say has not been proclaimed yet with regard to the state budget. If the budget really stays the way it is now, including the rigid formula for expenditures that have been imposed upon us, we will have to make substantial changes regarding our purchase plans. That would consequently mean a withdrawal of orders, which have already been submitted to some factories, especially orders for armored weaponry, antiarmor and antiaircraft means, and also other means of a so-called

small combat technique. By the way, I cannot reconcile myself with the fact that, through a vote by this or that Sejm deputy who cares only for his factory, we are forced to make purchases of items we do not really need. To make IRYDA the kind of equipment that would make us happy, one must still make a lot of changes in it. For the moment, the aircraft does not meet our expectations. Right now, we are waiting for a satisfactory final offer from Mielec.

[Lentowicz] Does the present budget make it possible for you to take any steps aimed at modernizing the Army?

[Wilecki] The time has finally come for radical decisions and measures. Our military technology is to a large extent decapitalized. We have argued for a long time now that a budget that equals 3 percent of the GDP would allow us to begin modernizing the combat equipment. We are still looking for internal reserves; however, tightening one's belt is possible to only a certain extent.

[Lentowicz] Today it is not only the extra parliamentary opposition that keeps saying that the Army is "becoming increasingly autonomous." You yourself keep the General Staff away from the press—that is, from the judgments of public opinion. Does the head of the General Staff feel that he is fairly controlled by the civilians?

[Wilecki] I think the political practice in the recent period has been healthy and rational. If we look at it through the prism of accepted customs here, we can say that the control is full. It is exercised by the president with his office, by the parliament with the Sejm National Defense Committee; the Supreme Chamber of Control has proved its competence for years; there is also my superior, the civilian minister of defense, with his entire very significant apparatus. The spokesman for civic rights also comes to visit our units. Therefore, I believe that there are enough controlling establishments. We propose, however, that these controls be followed by responsible and concrete decisions. This calls for appropriate provisions in the Constitution and other legal solutions. You can be certain that, if the head of the General Staff—let us call him "the first soldier"—has influence on the Armed Forces, all of the important decisions he makes are consulted with his superiors.

[Lentowicz] How often do you consult the president?

[Wilecki] Not very often. Let us say, as often as is needed.

[Lentowicz] Is this the result of the fact that the commander in chief trusts you entirely?

[Wilecki] We value the friendliness and understanding of the president toward the Army. The president has done a lot for the Army, and we are grateful that the atmosphere he has created allows us to carry out the transformation of the Armed Forces without any interruption.

[Lentowicz] Military people are saying many bitter words about parliament members. The present Ministry of National Defense [MON] head has reiterated them many times in public. Is this not going to be detrimental to the interests of the defense system in the Sejm?

[Wilecki] The previous and the present National Defense Committee are making efforts that must be appreciated. I am more critical of various groupings that, in a political fight and to achieve some temporary goals, exaggerate some problems, which are usually of secondary or even less importance and claim that they are strategic issues. This is not conducive to building the image of the Polish Army in the world. I am also often utterly upset by statements of irresponsible, accidental persons, who have not served in the Army and sometimes have had only a fleeting contact with our ministry. I also often reiterate that, in the area of defense, there are issues that are better discussed in the recess of an office, at a closed parliamentary session; we should not reveal our greater or smaller defense weaknesses at an international forum.

Interesting is the fact that, whenever we meet with our partners abroad, the Polish Army, not an exaggerated courtesy, by any means, is perceived as a strong, responsible, well-organized partner.

Actually, we are cooperating with all of our seven neighbors in the border areas. On the continent, we are looked upon as a considerable, medium-size European army that has temporary problems with technical equipment but that has valuable soldiers at its disposal. In comparison with some NATO armies, such as the Turkish, Spanish, and Italian Armies, we really should not be ashamed. All of those armies, apart from ultramodern technology, have equipment of previous generations; one can even find older tanks, aircraft, or drawn artillery there.

[Lentowicz] How should we explain the recent measures that practically subordinate the Military Information Services (intelligence and counterintelligence) to the General Staff and thus deprive the civilian minister of some of the powers he had before?

[Wilecki] Special services are an element of reconnaissance, and they are supposed to provide the Armed Forces with all of the necessary information and data. Military intelligence and counterintelligence must first of all be included in the state's defense system—that is, serve the purpose for which they have been established.

[Lentowicz] The case of the Military Information Services, transferring educational issues to the General Staff, as well as other steps of this kind lead one to believe that increasingly more prerogatives of the civilian head of the ministry are now being taken away from him and given to the military segment.

[Wilecki] There is no use exaggerating this problem. It must be remembered that, in the area of legal regulations, we have not done anything special thus far. In place of a totalitarian military commander, the head of MON, with enormous prerogatives and powers, we once put a civilian person who was entirely unprepared for that. It could be seen every single day that the duties

were greater than the capabilities of those people. Thus, every single day people in uniform had to explain certain issues, so obvious to them, to the inexperienced politicians. We lost a lot of energy explaining issues of secondary importance to them; there were many clashes, whereas the main problems remained unsolved. Therefore, I believe that first the powers must be divided very precisely "in high places"; they should be regulated by laws. I want to know exactly what my responsibility is in the area of the state's defense, of which the Army is only a fragment, and what the responsibility of the minister, as well as other cabinet members, is.

[Lentowicz] The new bill on the general duty of defense has been prepared in the General Staff, so it does reflect your viewpoint.

[Wilecki] This is really a dilemma of our times. However, who else should have drafted this law? The problem was that no one else was ready or able to deal with this matter. We propose that the solutions that have been arrived at in the General Staff now be discussed by politicians. Perhaps we will avoid a legislative catastrophe, which came in the wake of the recent amendment of the Law on General Defense Duty, the programmatic content of which was at that time not discussed with the military. Only now can we evaluate that the authors were guided by wishful thinking, emotions, and not by the desire to approach the building of a new defense system rationally. Instead of a comment, I will only say that, when last year we volunteered to provide politicians particularly interested in these issues with the most fundamental knowledge about the Army and the state defense system, and even prepared for that in the National Defense Academy, no politicians accepted the offer.

[Lentowicz] The Army does not willingly accept changes; it has always been a slightly conservative establishment. However, soldiers in barracks have for too long been waiting for new regulations—disciplinary regulations, for instance—that determine the life of military communities in units.

[Wilecki] I do not want to make my subordinates happy by force; they were brought up in a certain tradition. I do not want to do that by means of solutions that would not be accepted. The proposals of regulations are currently being consulted on a low level. Now, as for the conservatism, with which the Army feels quite good, I will only say that other armies as well as our state establishments envy us that. In opinion polls, in which the Army has been in the lead for a long time now, this pinch of conservatism is obviously approved of by the people as well.

[Lentowicz] What do you think of the political games aimed at introducing another "coalition" deputy minister to MON?

[Wilecki] The structures of the ministry cannot be built for the people who come there.

[Lentowicz] Does the Army now have any concrete plans concerning the "Partnership for Peace" initiative?

[Wilecki] We are now getting down to the practical dimension, related to the implementation of bilateral and multilateral political agreements. In the middle of this year in Denmark and Germany, there will be exercises with the participation of Polish soldiers; toward the end of the summer, maritime exercises will be conducted. Staff discussions on these issues have already begun. We are also planning joint training with the French Army. Today my French counterpart is beginning his visit to Poland.

Official Denies Refugee Agreement With Germany

AU0903213194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Excerpts] The authorities of North Rhine-Westphalia postponed the deportation of several hundred refugees from Serbia and Montenegro via Romania, an action that should have started tomorrow, the Interior Ministry of that land, quoted by AFP, announced. [passage omitted]

The Romanian General Directorate for Passports within the Ministry of Interior told our reporters tonight that there is no understanding regarding the arrival in transit of refugees from Serbia and Montenegro.

Tonight, at 2100, our correspondent received information from the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade that the Romanian charge d'affaires, Constantin Garbea, was received today at the FRG Foreign Ministry upon his request, where he presented the official position of Romania in connection with the deportation of the Yugoslav refugees from Germany and their transit through Romania on their way to Yugoslavia.

It was noted that no understanding or accord between the Governments of Romania and Germany regarding the transit through Timisoara of Yugoslav citizens who will be deported from Germany has been reached and rumors that were circulating are groundless.

Dniester Leaders Try To Prevent Voting

AU1003095294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 8 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Elena Tomulescu: "The 14th Army Started Reprisals Against Those Who Participated in Poll in the Republic of Moldova"]

[Text] On the occasion of the sociological poll "What People Advise," Dniester leader Smirnov's police closed the border crossing point at Gura Bacului, while in Dubasari the military control of Romanians who wished to go to the polls was intensified. The 14th Army took steps to find out who were the people who had voted in the parliamentary elections and the referendum,. The employees of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Moldova did not have the right to vote in the referendum, just as the they did not have the right to vote in the parliamentary elections either. As far as the results of the referendum are concerned, all the international observers announced that there was a much reduced presence at the polls in case of the referendum polls than in the parliamentary elections, and the government-backed television of the republic announced a presence of over 70 percent at the polls. Just as it has always been the case so far, the population was used to explain the prosoviet policy promoted by President Snegur.

Iliescu's Role in Government Reshuffle Considered

AU1003122294 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergiu Andon: "Who Knocks Out Whom?"]

[Text] The suspense in connection with the government formula for the hot season has suddenly ceased. A few hours before boarding the plane that was to take him to the peninsula that is dominated in the north by a red dictator and the south by a strongarm capitalist regime, as well as to the lands of an uncertain but nevertheless much eulogized Chinese model, Mr. Ion Iliescu strengthened the bolts and screws of the state mechanism with one energetic key move. Prime Minister Vacaroiu tried in an expansive statement to convey the message that the reshuffle was according to his proposals. He could convince no one. The reshuffle is a move that obviously reflects the will of the president and the people who surround him, made exactly at a time when the voyage to faraway countries demanded that a tranquilizer be administered to the public that stays at home and to the others who were stimulated by the desire to govern. It was also a fortifier for the muscles of the central administration.

The fact that the reshuffle was carried out in haste is also seen from the given situation that, except for the defense minister, no rotations could be found for any of the former dignitaries. The improvisation from this viewpoint is very clear. In order to assuage Petre Ninosu's indignation, they quickly turned to a formula that is typical of the old regime—namely, "he will be assigned to the Senate," as if appointing people to the Senate would still be decided in Office Number One and Office Number Two [reference to Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu].

After so many negotiations, delays, and euphemisms, the hasty reshuffle suggests an action carried out under conditions of great irritation. One can speculate quite a bit about the reasons for this irritation. In any event, the public attacks to which many heads of the current political life were submitted was not the most upsetting thing, since the changes rather satisfy than discourage the slanderer nationalism. However, it would not be an exaggeration to assume that the journalistic performance, as well as the misdemeanor, to listen to the president's telephone and disclose the stenogram of the talks without any other obvious political reason but to simply make noise and show "who knocks out whom?" seem to somehow be connected with the only concrete and threatening declaration gathered from the new dignitaries—namely, the statement made by the justice minister. In one of his states of strictness, which draws water to both the mill of sympathizers and the rivals, the president seems to have been insistent in his wish to demonstrate "who knocks out whom?" especially before the long journey.

The way in which the reshuffle was carried out—compared to the previous declarations of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] leaders, with the effort to pretend holding a dialogue with various political forces and the entire current driving force of the country—makes us assume that the government changes have been carried out not only with a formal consultation of the prime minister but also over the heads of those who made calculations and competition within the ruling party. Not to accept this interpretation means to assume that the PDSR is a much too conspiring formula and much too hypocritical for an important party in a real democracy.

Still, there is a common element between the president and the party—the continuously monocolor character of the government. In the light of the same relationship between the party and the president, one should also think of the very serious declaration made by [former Defense Minister] General Spiroiu upon leaving the cabinet: "I can tell you that the Army is under political control."

As a matter of fact, we are not just talking about the Army but all the levers of state authority. That can be seen by anyone who is looking at the list of portfolios that have been rotated. The official declaration of the president to the effect that the goal of the changes was to accelerate the reform process, curb inflation, and stabilize economic life in general sound either superficial or cynical. In this context, even the transportation department appears significant under a strategic rather than economic aspect. Thus, there is no doubt that the goal of this reshuffle—the same goal that has been pursued for a long time now—was to strengthen authority through a new act of authority.

Also in accordance with a more general style, certain appearances are also kept for those people abroad, especially when deciding on those changes that might acquire a European significance, when, in reality, all they do is satisfy internal political calculations. Here is just one example: the reference to the number of civilians who took the seat of generals is exaggerated when one thinks of the absence of any reference to the large file of incomplete legislation compared with the European legislation. And all this, when one of the four changes refers exactly to a "specialized" minister.

Smiling in a diplomatic way toward other countries, the political behavior of our president also seems connected with the hidden thought "who knocks out whom?"

CDR, PD-FSN Criticism

AU1003070494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] This afternoon, the leaders of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and those of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD-FSN] discussed the political situation following the recent government reshuffle.

A declaration was signed that specifies that the parliamentary opposition parties believe that the reshuffle was carried out by ignoring the parliament; thus the situation has been reached that a third of the current government is made up of people who have not been confirmed by the parliament.

At the same time, the party leaders expressed their common attitude toward the replacement of Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu as head of the Ministry of National Defense within the context, quote, of intolerable extremist attacks against the military institution, something that creates great concern about the modernization and reform process, a measure that will exert a negative effect on the army and that will lead to the instability of basic institutions of the Romanian state, unquote.

The declaration expresses the parties' joint position in connection with the attacks—which are viewed as immoral—against former political detainees of the communist regime coming, quote, from some of the most docile servants of that regime, unquote.

In conclusion of the declaration, all the leaders of the opposition parties call on those responsible within the current government majority not to waste the chance for a rapid recovery of the material situation of our country's citizens.

Our reporter has also informed us that the PD(FSN) secretary, Mr. Cristian Radulescu, specified that tomorrow's planned meeting between the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] and the PD(FSN) has been postponed until next week. The date will be announced later. The reason for the postponement is the prolongation of the PDSR permanent delegation meeting that will be held tomorrow.

Commentary on Cabinet

AU0903162594 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 7 Mar 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu commentary: "A Reshuffle That Does Not Solve Anything"]

[Text] Yesterday morning, on the seventh day of the week, which was created by the Lord for all humans to rest, the news started circulating among political and press circles that at the Cotroceni [presidential headquarters] audio and video cables were being laid down to record the oath-taking ceremony of the newly appointed ministers. Many thought that is was just a joke. In order to have new ministers sworn in, first the old ones have to go. Until yesterday morning no one knew anything about any imminent government reshuffle. This is how yesterday at the Cotroceni they managed to set a new record of condensing into just a few minutes events that usually stretch over several days: The announcement of the government reshuffle, the announcing of the names of the new ministers, the oath-taking ceremony, and the sipping of the customary glass of champagne. Taking

into consideration that all these historic moments took place at once, on Sunday at noon, when people are usually trying to cure their hangovers, we can safely say without fear of contradiction that this was a genuine original in the history of Romanian and even world politics. What made the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] leaders and Ion Iliescu adopt such a style of doing things—that is, covering things in secrecy while gasping because of the sudden effort—remains an enigma. In the next few days, when people will be less careful to keep their mouths shut, they will probably offer us the solution to this mystery. Until then all we can do is remark that such a style is far from being able to meet the requirements of democracy, which may be defined precisely by the long pondering that precedes decisionmaking, and that previously decisions were usually subject to debates or, at least, to the test of public opinion. Having secretly appointed Petre Salcudeanu as culture minister, the PDSR was subsequently surprised to find that the dignitary in question does not refrain from going to work with blurry eyes and with the zipper of his pants open [reference to photograph of minister in a compromising situation]. Let us hope that the PDSR will not be surprised in a similar way by any of the new ministers sworn in yesterday!

It is very difficult to work out a formula explaining the latest moves of the government party. It froze the negotiations with its left-wing allies to set up the red pentagon government [coalition consisting of PDSR, the National Romanian Unity Party—PUNR, the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania—PDAR, the Socialist Party of Labor—PSM, and the Greater Romania Party—PRM], and opened negotiations with opposition parties. Despite the fact that PDSR issued a firm declaration engaging in a controversy with the left-wing political parties, the government party was very careful not to severe all the links connecting it with the PUNR, the PRM, and the PSM. This ambiguous stance made many of the country's nationalists wonder toward which end of the political scale the PDSR is actually leaning: the right or the left? Does yesterday's reshuffle answer that question? In my opinion, it does not. A closer look at yesterday's changes shows that the PDSR headed by Iliescu continues to play a double game. Some of the replacements were intended to satisfy the left wing, such as Niculae Spiroiu's ousting from the leadership of the defense ministry. Other replacements were designed to please the right wing, such as the ousting of George Ioan Danescu. One can assume that all these changes made the object of previous discreet consultations with the parties both on the left and the right of our political spectrum. However, considering that friendship does not count much in politics, one can safely assume that what the PDSR actually wanted to achieve by this government reshuffle is to continue to play the ball alone. After all, it cannot be excluded that the new ministers were appointed merely because they pass as reliable members of the government party and supporters of Ion Iliescu. They need reliable people if early elections are to be held, as in such electoral processes the key ministries are those of the interior and justice.

While in terms of the power struggle the reshuffle represents an important moment, in terms of the struggle to pull the country out of the current crisis it totally lacks significance. Trying to explain the replacements, the PDSR and Ion Iliescu claimed that they were necessary because more competence was required. However, it is quite clear that more competence was needed in areas other than those in which the reshuffle occurred. The latter, except for transportation, had been working quite well under the leadership of their former ministers. More competence would have been needed in the key ministries for the promotion of reform and privatization. But the reshuffle avoided precisely those sectors, while preferring those that are fundamental for the PDSR's survival. This gives us the right to assert that once more, the PDSR has placed party interests above the general interests of the country. The earth-shaking, epoch-making government reshuffle with which the PDSR has been threatening us over the past month does not solve anything.

Roman Views Need for Help in Integration

AU0903184294 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 7 Mar 94 p 3

[Report on lecture given by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front), at a conference held in Bucharest on 4 March on "Romania's Integration Into the Free World"]

[Text] Within the framework of the Romanian Athenaeum Conferences, the conference on "Romania's Integration in the Free World" was held at the Romanian Peasant Museum on Friday, 4 March. Mr. Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD-FSN] presented this lecture, while Messrs. Dan Amedeo Lazarescu, vice president of the National Liberal Party [PNL], and Andrei Plesu, acted as collocutors.

At the beginning of his lecture, Mr. Petre Roman referred to an inescapable fact:

"Reform is our country's road beyond communism. Certainly, all the former communist countries are experiencing a reform process. For us and in general, reform means seeking economic, social, and political normality, a normality of mentality, day-to-day normality, and, in the final instance, normality from a historical perspective. What is at stake is seeking not only our initial normality. We also have to ensure a synchronization with developments in the Western world and our entry into today's flow of world history. This self- discovery may be achieved not because it represents a recovery, but only because it represents the key to our access to modernity. In this century, Romania has run up a deficit of modernity caused by the fierce struggle with the numerous vicissitudes of history. This deficit exists and

manifests itself in institutions with hardly any power, in a faulty and often confusing operation of democracy, in acute economic inefficiency, and in the insufficient competence of the most dynamic segments of practical activity. For those who love freedom, the way of post-communist transition cannot be anything other than openly moving toward the free world and then fusing with it (...) Romania's integration into the free world is not an ideal, but a tangible stage of our hopes. Our strength lies in the fact that we are able to say what we are; and we would be more powerful today if we clearly stated what we want to be (...)

"For us easterners, our mission is to reestablish and repair the thread that was broken on the eve of World War II and replaced, for almost 45 years, by communist integration with the internationalist Gulag. Our country's totalitarian past did not only mean lagging behind, but also being torn away from its times altogether. We are able to demonstrate that communist totalitarianism isolated us compared with the progress made in the free world. Because it was utopian, communism felt threatened by everything that was real and thus became obtuse and terrorizing."

Referring to Romania's economic situation between the two world wars, Mr. Roman specified the following:

"The statistics demonstrated that the main influence on the rhythm, proportions, and structures of the economy was exerted by the process of expanding the free market, a process that was, however, characterized by a hesitant liberalization practice."

He specified that "the statistics on our country's economic situation revealed disturbing facts: Both at the end of the inter- war period, and in 1989—after 45 years of communism—Romania ranked 23d out of the 24 European states. In 1989, the country's GNP was 3.5 times lower than the European average. Also in 1989, for one GNP unit Romania used to consume 10 times more prime energy than Western European countries. During the 25 years of Ceausescu's dictatorship, $230 billion was injected in our economy, which ranked 23d in Europe in terms of efficiency. Given the injection into the economy of such important sums of money, it would have been absolutely normal for economic efficiency, in general, to come close to the European average, something that was not even achieved in, let us say, the better periods of the dictatorial regime. (...) The communist regime, specifically the Ceausescu one, made Romania lose out on the great and truly revolutionary changes in Western society. I am talking of the technological revolution both in industry and agriculture of the 1960's, the revolution of inexpensive energy and the technological economizing on energy of the 1970's, and, finally, of the data processing revolution in the 1980's."

For Romania's integration into the free world, it is necessary, in Mr. Petre Roman's opinion, to take a number of measures: "Genuine national policies have to be put into motion, policies with precise aims, meaning primarily restructuring and privatization to ensure efficiency; conversion to eliminate waste; and adjustment and training to improve competence. We are no longer allowed to neglect, by any means in our political activity, such key words in the modern world as profitability, efficiency, efficient management, and productivity. It is clear that only economic freedom can ensure efficiency; exercising this freedom, however, should not generate unbearable effects for numerous people. (...)

"Thus we favor a competitive and equitable economic order. To overcome our historically accumulated economic and social deficit, Romania needs to adjust its economic credit, for a relatively short time, to the development model based on intercorrelated strategies. Namely: Obtaining resources for financing credits; giving an impetus to all kinds of investment; the development of markets to encourage profitable investment; and a selective and dynamic role of the state in managing and guiding the development process."

Summing up the ideas of his lecture, Mr. Petre Roman formulated the following objective: "Economic reconstruction and political democratization to ensure genuine national sovereignty." He stressed that without assistance on the part of the free world, Romania will not be able to integrate into Europe and recover.

Union Leader Views Conflict With Government

AU0903181694 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 1 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Victor Ciorbea, chairman of the CNSRL-Fratia Trade Union Confederation, by Constantin Mesenschi; place and date not given: "We Want Opposition Parties To Participate in the Government Also"]

[Text] [Mesenschi] Mr. Chairman, how do you view the results of the round of negotiations that have been held with the representatives of the government?

[Ciorbea] Unfortunately, we noticed that they showed a tendency to drag things out when it comes to finding solutions to the problems that we are currently facing. Most of the 14 claims formulated by the CNSRL [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions]-Fratia were on a list that was submitted to the government as early as in May 1993 and those claims can be found again in the protocol concluded on 6 May 1993 between the confederations that started the general strike and the government. Eleven claims were included among the requests expressed by our trade union confederation at the 18 November rally. Immediately after the rally, during the round of negotiations held on 20 November, certain solutions were agreed upon and were to be adopted by the government within two weeks at the latest. This has not happened, so the problem is still topical, but meantime, another three claims have been added to the previous ones.

In conclusion, the discussions held recently with the government representatives have remained at a level of information exchanges and the government presented certain intentions and proposals that can be found in the draft activity program of that institution. Looking at things realistically, we believe that by not granting our claims, there was no way for the 28 February strike to be avoided.

[Mesenschi] What problems do you currently have to face and how do you believe they can be solved in time?

[Ciorbea] The 14 claims can be divided into two main groups. One refers to the acceleration of the reform process, that is, privatization, economic restructuring, ways to halt the subsidizing of those sectors that are working at a loss, and the need to introduce a new fiscal system, etc. The other refers to claims of a social nature, such as the need for the memorandum [with the IMF] to be accompanied by a program of social protection measures, particularly for the most disadvantaged groups of people, that is, the unemployed, the young, and pensioners.

Thus, our claims could be solved in a very short time, a minimum salary throughout the economy and a salary-price ratio could be established, and negotiations regarding the amount of money that will be allotted for the budget could start at once. But, first of all, it is necessary that the government and the Ministry of Finance show openness in connection with the draft budget, since both the provisions of Law 13/1991 regarding the collective labor contract as well as Article 15 of the collective labor contract at national level are currently being completely ignored. These laws stipulate that before the endorsement of the law on the budget, the representatives of trade union federations in all budgetary sectors and the representatives of the executive should hold negotiations on how much money will be allotted for the respective areas. We are at the end of February and those discussions have not even started yet, and we were not even given the document that contains the draft budget for 1994.

We have never had such a delay in negotiating the collective labor contract at the national level. The position adopted by the employers' association recently was extremely rigid, and even culminated with their representative being absent from the round of negotiations convened at the meeting with Dan Mircea Popescu. Thus, we can see that neither the employers' association nor the government are displaying any real desire to find solutions to the problems that we are currently facing.

Another group of claims refer to the need to have urgent programs endorsed immediately or to have them included in the norms, government decisions, or draft laws that have to be submitted to the parliament in urgent procedures. In this category I can mention some measures of social protection, such as establishing tripartite bodies, to ensure professional retraining, and modifying the package of laws that refers to the rights of trade unions and to labor legislation. But mainly they should refer to concrete measures to accelerate the reform process in the economic sector: privatization, restructuring, finding solutions to the economic-financial blockage problems, etc.

[Mesenschi] In that respect, how do you view the program of measures and actions drafted by the government to achieve the goals included in the government program for 1994?

[Ciorbea] Unfortunately, many provisions in this program can be found only a few years after the time we claimed them. The provisions regarding other claims are stipulated in extremely general terms, without any presentation of measures through which they could be implemented. Solutions to this program will almost totally depend on the implementation of the provisions included in the Memorandum concluded with the IMF. But, as is well known, there are real difficulties in this respect, because certain previous conditions have to be fulfilled and they have not been achieved to this very day. After the Memorandum is approved, there is still the question of the political will of the government to implement the provisions. Therefore, I must repeat our viewpoint that, in order to find solutions to those clauses stipulated in the memorandum, which are so very necessary to achieve macro-economic stability and mainly to obtain foreign financing, it is absolutely necessary to establish a new parliamentary majority. We believe this to be necessary because, in practical terms, we are currently witnessing an obstruction at the parliamentary level. That became even more obvious when the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] and the PRM [Greater Romania Party] broke off relations, something that has become a reality. It is absolutely necessary to draft a new government program that basically should include concrete measures to enable the implementation of those provisions and the achievement of real social protection for the more disadvantaged social strata. Obviously, on the basis of this new parliamentary majority and of the program that I was talking about, a new government should be established. We would like to have a coalition government that should include the main opposition parties as well, because the social and economic crisis that we are currently facing can be solved only if we start solving the political crisis.

[Mesenschi] What have you done to achieve that goal?

[Ciorbea] We have recently been holding meetings at various levels. On the one hand, we have held discussions with the representatives of the government in an attempt to solve these claims and, on the other hand, we have held talks with our colleagues at the Alfa-Cartel, the leaders of the major opposition parties, and the PDSR leaders. During those discussions we wanted to find out

what possibilities there are to establish a coalition government and a parliamentary majority, and to work out a new ruling program.

[Mesenschi] How are relations between the CNSRL-Fratia, Alfa- Cartel, and the BNS [National Trade Union Block] in terms of new trade union activities?

[Ciorbea] In accordance with the decision made during the latest meeting of the Executive Committee of our confederation, we are cooperating with the Alfa-Cartel with a view to carrying out certain joint activities. We noted with satisfaction the change of date of the general strike announced by the Alfa-Cartel, from 16 February to 28 February, as this has allowed the actions of our confederations to take place simultaneously. Similarly, we have agreed that if the general strike on 28 February does not have the expected effect, in March or April we will organize actions of greater scope such as rallies and a march in Bucharest and other towns. We might also organize a general strike by blocking roads, major arteries, etc.

For the time being, we are cooperating with the National Trade Union Block so as to finalize the collective labor contract for this year, a contract that the three confederations CNSRL-Fratia, Cartel- Alfa, and the BNS wish to sign on behalf of the trade unions. We would be pleased if the BNS participated in the organization of other joint activities in the coming period.

[Mesenschi] Mr. Ciorbea, please tell us what you think will be the consequences of the establishment of a government that would include the current parliamentary majority?

[Ciorbea] We hope that such a government will not be established, because this is one of the goals of the 28 February actions, to prevent such an act. The separation of the PDSR from the PRM represented a positive sign in this respect. We hope that a similar evolution will take place also regarding relations with other extremist, nationalist, and anti-Semitic parties. If, nevertheless, such a government were established, it is certain that the reactions, at least on the international plane, would be extremely unfavorable. There would even be a very big question mark next to the approval of the Memorandum if such a government were established. Similarly, the entire range of Romania's foreign relations and actions aimed at integration into European structures or NATO would be affected by such a decision. Obviously, international reaction would also have consequences for the domestic arena.

All these things also concern us, that is, trade unions, because such actions will be reflected directly in the evolution of the Romanian economy and the social and economic crisis in our country.

[Mesenschi] How will you hold a dialogue with such a government and how far will you go with your action in March or April?

[Ciorbea] In accordance with the decisions passed by the leading bodies of our confederation, we have not had, we do not have, and we will not have any relations with extremist, nationalist, or anti-Semitic parties. Thus, the problem of our relations with such a government would become an extremely serious problem, if we were to accept a dialogue or negotiations with an executive that includes such a formula. Obviously, our actions planned for March or April would be more aggressive if the executive opted for such a formula. I believe that our actions would reach extreme limits.

[Mesenschi] What do you mean by reaching extreme limits?

[Ciorbea] To stop the establishment of such a government. If, nevertheless, it were to be established, our actions would be directed toward dissolving such a government and replacing it with another one, based on a new parliamentary majority and a new program, which I mentioned before.

[Mesenschi] There has been much talk about the possible presence of the CNSRL-Fratia leaders at the helm of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. What should trade union members expect—and not only they—from a minister of labor who comes from their ranks?

[Ciorbea] No doubt such an act would also have positive aspects, but it would also involve certain risks, both for the respective organization as well as for the person in question. Among the advantages I could mention that the respective leader would take all the necessary measures to establish the legal basis for the tripartite leadership and social partnership, for a new labor legislation, and for new rights for employees in the industrial sectors and union members, which would be in accordance with generally accepted European and international standards. He would consider the trade union a serious partner in the social dialogue and would immediately proceed to the establishment of those triparty bodies, ensuring professional retraining, and establishing a socioeconomic council, etc.

Similarly, such a leader would be concerned with ensuring real and adequate social protection mainly for the most disadvantaged strata of the population in this period of transition, using all the available funds in that ministry to maximum effect: the unemployment fund, social security, and important sums that come from the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program or from loans obtained from the World Bank and the IMF. He would do all this to curb as quickly as possible the substantial, even twofold, increase in unemployment that is expected by the end of this year .

However, such a government would also take special risks because it is certain that currently or in the near future, of the ministries in our country, the Ministry of Labor will be the one most difficult to manage because it is necessary to ensure social protection while financial resources are limited as we know.

[Mesenschi] In your view, is it possible that a political pact, including a social pact as well, will be signed in the current political situation?

[Ciorbea] If, by political pact we understand an accord concluded with absolutely all the parliamentary parties, then my answer is negative. I do not believe that there are adequate conditions in this respect and, I repeat it, the break between the PDSR and the PRM emphasizes the impossibility, at least for the time being, of achieving such a pact.

On the other hand, it is very possible to conclude a government pact based on a new parliamentary majority that at the same time might include the necessary—albeit not sufficient—conditions to begin negotiations regarding the social pact that the country badly needs to overcome this period of crisis.

Redman, Izetbegovic, Delic Discuss Accord

AU0903193994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Today Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, received Mr. Charles Redman, special envoy of Bill Clinton, and General (Galvin), special envoy for military affairs.

The meeting was also attended by Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Commander General Delic. They discussed the possibilities for the implementation of the agreement between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council, on which General (Galvin) and his team will offer their assistance.

Izetbegovic Interviewed on Confederation Issues

LD0903193494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Our colleague Tihomir Ladisic talked with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic through a satellite link this afternoon. Here are excerpts from the conversation:

[Begin recording] [Ladisic] What has been promised to you, President Izetbegovic, what do you expect from this federation in Bosnia and the confederation with Croatia?

[Izetbegovic] I must say that this agreement is a result of our interests—they did not have to bribe us or pay us to conclude it. However, they told us, the most authoritative instances—they told both us and Croatian officials, I believe they told President Tudjman—that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will have an open door to all forms of European integration. Step by step, of course, but this door will remain open and we will receive lavish support for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged parts of the country. We will receive financial aid. They were unequivocal in this. Of course, we Bosnians were told that Western forces would come and help out in the implementation of what has been agreed.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, would you agree to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Serbs consented to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina but made this conditional on the creation of a confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia?

[Izetbegovic] I believe I can give a brief reply to that: out of the question.

[Ladisic] Does that mean that the creation of a new Yugoslavia under pressure from the world powers would also be out of the question?

[Izetbegovic] I think there is too much speculation surrounding the world powers' ideas on the creation of a new Yugoslavia. As far as I could deduce from my contacts, such an idea is not being entertained by serious, responsible people in the West. I am not saying that certain individuals are not in favor of such a thing, but I believe that such an idea is not being voiced as a realistic possibility—I have not heard anything to this effect so far, in any form. There has been talk about certain forms of cooperation between the states created on the ruins of the old Yugoslavia—economic cooperation—but nobody had even hinted at the creation of some state entity. [end recording]

Calls Accord 'Giant Step'

AU0903213094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Interview with President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic by an unidentified correspondent for Croatian Television on 9 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, gave an interview to Croatian Television today in which he spoke about the Washington documents, the creation of a federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the confederation with Croatia.

[Correspondent] There have not been any, or rather, there have been very few reactions from Sarajevo to the Washington preliminary agreement. How would you personally comment on this, as it is of great interest to us?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that this was a good agreement. Naturally, I was in contact with Dr. Silajdzic throughout the entire duration of the negotiations in Washington—I talked to him two or three times a day. Therefore, the general agreement that was created there was created with my full approval. So, if you ask me for my comment, it is positive.

[Correspondent] It is often being said that the agreement reached in Washington was extorted from you and President Tudjman. Was the agreement truly reached out of political interests or is this agreement a result of pressures and threats from U.S. policy and the Islamic countries?

[Izetbegovic] In any case, this concerns our interests, naturally, and I would not say that it was extorted. I would like to remind you that I put forward almost an identical proposal sometime last year; I believe that your press noted it. On that occasion I proposed a joint state for the Muslims and the Croats, stretching from the Sava River to the sea, without borders, and perhaps with cantons. This agreement was not extorted as regards myself and we saw our interest in it, of course.

[Correspondent] We are facing the signing of an historic agreement, as we perceive it here in Croatia, namely on the federation of Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the confederation of such a Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Republic of Croatia. Is this a just end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I would be very happy if this were the end of the war. It might be that it is the end of the war and I believe that this is the end of the war—I want to believe

so—on those territories inhabited by Muslims and Croats. However the end of the war now depends on the Serbian side. You have used the expression, the attribute, federal. Well, I would say that this will be a just end to the war. However, as I have said, the end of the war on Bosnia-Herzegovina territory now depends on the Serbian side.

[Correspondent] Before we touch upon the problem of the relations [word indistinct] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would like to ask the following: Central Bosnia, Mostar, and the access to the sea were the main problems. Are these issues resolved by the preliminary agreement or [words indistinct] the problems that could endanger the entire agreement?

[Izetbegovic] They have not been entirely resolved yet. To my knowledge, their resolution is imminent, and perhaps this is being discussed there [in Vienna] today. However, I do not believe that they could threaten the agreement. You have mentioned three problems—Mostar, Central Bosnia, and the sea.

I think that Mostar has been temporarily resolved with the concept of the European Union [EU] administration, and therefore, by the EU administering the town temporarily. I believe that this solution is good even though it is, of course, not a final solution.

The issue of access to the sea has been resolved, too, I believe, with the concept of confederation, by which the federation would have access to the sea in Neum and would have the use of the port of Ploce. Reciprocal arrangements have been made here that envisage the free movement of goods and people from Croatia via the territory of the federation, and naturally, the free movement of goods and people from the federation toward Ploce. This situation would be as though there were no borders. I believe that this issue is resolved.

The very delicate issue of central Bosnia, however, remains. As I understand it, there are some ideas that this issue be resolved by establishing sub-cantons within the central Bosnian canton. In any case, I believe that this is the most sensitive question left. I think that it will be discussed today and tomorrow and [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] What seems the biggest problem to you and what makes you the most optimistic?

[Izetbegovic] I can say that with this agreement with the Croats here in Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the agreement between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as states—naturally they have not been signed yet [words indistinct] but we are on the best way to sign them—we have definitely made a giant step toward peace. However, an (?open) issue of the behavior of the Serbs remains. I can not forecast their behavior no matter how hard I try, and therefore, I could not answer whether peace is a matter of a month or two. However, I have a sort of premonition that [passage indistinct].

Accord 'Was Not Extorted'

LD0903221294 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2010 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Interview via satellite with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic by correspondent Tihomir Ladisic—recorded]

[Text] [Ladisic] A new turnabout in the international political arena. The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Croat-Bosniak federation, a possible confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina—these are the topics of our conversation with President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic. Mr. Izetbegovic, good evening.

[Izetbegovic] Good evening to you.

[Ladisic] There have been no, or at least there have been very few reactions from Sarajevo to the Washington preliminary agreement. How would you personally comment on it?

[Izetbegovic] I think that this was a good agreement. Of course, I was in touch with Haris Silajdzic while the negotiations were in progress in Washington. I spoke with him two or three times a day. The preliminary agreement that was reached there was reached with my full agreement. If you ask me about my comment, it is positive.

[Ladisic] Did you speak with the people in Sarajevo, with your closest associates, with commanders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army? What are their comments on the preliminary Washington agreement?

[Izetbegovic] I followed the press, I heard some statements. I can say that the news on the agreement was met with support, globally speaking. Of course, there are skeptics, while some witty people have labelled it as a marriage of convenience, not a marriage of love. But I wonder now whether there are some political marriages that are not of convenience, and people say that marriages of convenience are sometimes more stable. People believe that both sides have done well out of this and I share that opinion.

[Ladisic] It has been said quite frequently that the Washington agreement was extorted from you and President Tudjman. Was the agreement really signed out of political interests, or is it an agreement signed due to the pressure and threats coming from the U.S. Government or some Islamic countries?

[Izetbegovic] Of course, our interests are at work here. But I could not say that it was extorted. I would like to remind you that I put forward a similar, identical proposal last summer. I think that it was mentioned in your press. My proposal then was a joint Muslim-Croat state between the Sava and the sea, without any borders, perhaps with cantons. Therefore, this agreement was not extorted as far as I am concerned. Of course, we saw our interests in that.

[Ladisic] What remains now is to sign this historic agreement, as we see it here in Croatia, namely on the Croat-Bosniak federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a confederation of that Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Republic of Croatia. Does this represent a just end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I would be very happy if this were the end of the war. Maybe it is the end of the war. I hope it is the end of the war. I want to believe that this is the end of the war in Muslim and Croat-populated areas. But the end to the war now depends on the Serb side. You used an attribute—a just end—I would say that this is a just end to the war. However, as I said, the end of the war on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina now depends on the Serb side.

[Ladisic] Before we reach this issue concerning relations with the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would like to ask you: Central Bosnia, Mostar, access to the sea, these were the central issues; have these issues been resolved by the preliminary agreement or do you still deem them as issues that could jeopardize the entire accord?

[Izetbegovic] This has not been completely resolved. To our knowledge, the resolution of these problems is forthcoming, they might be discussing this today, but I do not believe this could bring the agreement into question. You mentioned three problems—Mostar, central Bosnia, the sea. I think Mostar has been temporarily resolved with the European Union's [EU] administration, therefore, the EU would be in temporary control of the city, I believe that this solution is good although it is certainly not a final solution.

The issue of access to the sea—I believe this has been solved through the concept of the federation by which the federation has an outlet to the sea via Neum and has the right to use the port at Ploce. Reciprocal arrangements have been made in this case that envisage free flow of goods and people from Croatia through the territory of the federation and, of course, the free flow of goods and people from the federation to Ploce. This would resemble a situation where there are no borders.

So, I think this issue has been resolved, but what remains is the extremely delicate issue of central Bosnia. As far as I can gather, there are some ideas according to which this should be resolved within the central Bosnian canton, some subcantons, in any case, I believe that this remains the most delicate issue and this will be discussed today and tomorrow, so I think we will know more tomorrow evening. That is what I expect.

[Ladisic] Speaking of central Bosnia, please tell us something about what you believe to be the core issue in central Bosnia—is the issue in question demarcation?

[Izetbegovic] You know, there is a complete ethnic balance here. Moreover, the population is mixed to the point of being topsy-turvy. Subsequently, some towns with a predominantly Muslim population have come closer to Herzegovina and, in contrast, areas with a predominantly Croat population like Busovaca and Novi Travnik have become closer to the Zenica region, therefore there has been a jumble. This could have been the motive for the conflict between us and the Croats, but the main reason why I proposed a joint state this summer was because I felt we would be fighting over central Bosnia—fighting hopelessly and without any results. I wanted to avoid this conflict. Of course, this problem has resurfaced in a new constellation of circumstances, in a new atmosphere, so I expect us to find some kind of solution. As I said, solutions have been proposed in the form of sub-cantons. This might be a solution, but let us wait a day or two—our negotiators are twisting their brains over this issue in Vienna right now.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, you have said that the crisis was most difficult in central Bosnia and Mostar where most of the combat took place. Are you optimistic, bearing in mind that the cease-fire has been in place in those areas for more than a week?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I am optimistic. Two days ago I was still a bit wary and then I saw a TV report showing the withdrawal of heavy weapons. You probably saw that report too. It was then that I was certain that both sides were serious in their intentions. Of course, we mostly worried about the Croat side. At that moment I understood that the Croat side too wanted the agreement to be implemented and that is why I am optimistic.

[Ladisic] How would you assess the cooperation between the two army commanders? It seems that General Rasim Delic and General Ante Roso played a key role in connection with this cease-fire agreement.

[Izetbegovic] I think that we were fortunate to have two reasonable men in this role. I believe that they respect each other as men and as soldiers, and I believe that they had no hidden agenda. I believe we have been fortunate that the two of them discussed the delicate military problem. Many unresolved issues remain in this field. You know that we still have to resolve the issue of a future joint army, joint commands; how to unify units which have been fighting each other until recently. I believe that Generals Delic and Roso will be able to resolve this problem with our full support of course.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, after a long time we have an opportunity to discuss the reasons for the clashes, particularly in central Bosnia and in Mostar. The leader of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mate Boban, resigned and many in the world saw this as a major Croat concession in their negotiations with the Muslims.

[Izetbegovic] I believe that Boban's resignation was necessary in this case. I have to be blunt when I tell you that our public is justified when it considers him to be an author and initiator of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand you said that he was the leader of Bosnian Croats. Many of our Bosnian Croats do not think that he was the leader of Bosnian Croats; maybe he was the leader of one-third of Bosnian Croats. When I take into account the sentiments of Croats in

central Bosnia, northern Bosnia, Posavina, or Tuzla, I could not say that he has any support and that he could win any kind of elections. Anyway, he was not elected leader of Bosnian Croats, he did not pass the test of elections.

[Ladisic] But, President Izetbegovic, do you see a problem in statements such as: There are no Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was said by Arif Pasalic; or, We should have reached an agreement with the Serbs, which was said by Ejup Ganic; or, The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army must have a naval base in Neum, which was said by Semso Tankovic, chairman of the Party of Democratic Action for Croatia. These statements triggered off very tempestuous reactions in Croatia and, I believe, among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Izetbegovic] First of all, a distinction ought to be made between statements and deeds. When I spoke earlier about Mate Boban, I spoke about his deeds, about his actions, not his statements. There have been very many statements which I may have not liked, but they did not inflict any direct damage on anyone. As regards statements that you have just mentioned, I am completely sure about one thing: Ganic never said that we needed an alliance with the Serbs. You have to check on that. Please look for it somewhere. I have never heard such a statement, although I know very well what Ganic says, as we are very close associates. I know what he thinks, and therefore I know what he might say. The other two statements are probably authentic. However, we forbade our soldiers, not only because of Pasalic's statement, but also because of others, to make political statements. They are not going to do that any more. As far as Semso Tankovic's statement is concerned, he is a citizen of Croatia, it is true that he is a Bosnian by birth, a very good friend and associate of mine, but I do not think that his statement that we need to have some kind of naval base in Neum is a dangerous one. That would be a navy of the future federation. This should be perceived in that way.

[Ladisic] I believe that this occasion gives us an opportunity to openly show many cards. As regards Mr. Ganic's statement, it was taken from the foreign press. But, generally speaking, do you think that the time for normalization has come and that we should turn toward the future and that we should try to build this trust together?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, if somebody asked what I ought to tell both ours and the Croatian public, even though you did not explicitly ask me to do that, but this is how I understand your question, then I would say that we should all look toward the future, rather than look back into the past. The past is teeming with bad things, particularly dating from recent times, while the future offers a ray of light. I think that we should turn toward the future, and look with optimism toward our future.

[Ladisic] If the agreement is signed, Croatia expects support for the reintegration of its occupied areas and political, security, and economic aid from the West. What has been promised to you, President Izetbegovic, what do you expect from this federation in Bosnia and the confederation with Croatia?

[Izetbegovic] I must tell you that this agreement is a result of our interests—they did not have to bribe us or pay us to conclude it. However, they told us, the most authoritative instances—they told both us and Croatian officials, I believe they told President Tudjman—that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will have an open door to all forms of European integration. Step by step, of course, but this door will remain open and we will receive lavish support for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged parts of the country. We will receive financial aid. They were unequivocal in this. Of course, we Bosnians were told that Western forces would come and help out in the implementation of what has been agreed.

[Ladisic] Croatian President Tudjman said the Croat-Bosnian [Muslim] agreement was not a military alliance aimed against the Serbs. Do you see a solution and an end to the war without the military defeat of the Serb army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a return of the occupied territories to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I could join President Tudjman in his assessment that this is not aimed against the Serbs. This statement is well- grounded and appropriate. And speaking of this—the military defeat of the Serbs and the recovery of our territories—the military defeat of the Serbs is desireable but not essential for the establishment of peace. However, the return of occupied territories is both desirable and essential. This is a condition we will not give up.

[Ladisic] Has the world guaranteed in any way that these Serb-occupied territories could be recovered?

[Izetbegovic] There have been no direct guarantees. You know, however, that the draft federation agreement prescribes in one of its first articles that the federation is to be created on territories populated by a predominantly Croat and Muslim population. This was done in the presence of the Americans, with the knowledge of the west Europeans—everybody welcomed this agreement in principle—that is to say, that this envisages the return of all territories, Muslim and Croat. Therefore, this is not explicit, but it is implicit.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, the federation agreement has also been offered to the Serb side these days, what do you expect from this offer—will the Serbs accept it, if not, if partition takes place and Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided, how could things be divided and what could the Serbs keep for themselves?

[Izetbegovic] The agreement—we have done this on numerous occasions and I believe the Croats have done so as well—the agreement is also open to the Serbs. Silajdzic is in Russia today and I think he is discussing

this problem. Redman was in Belgrade yesterday and I believe his talks with Milosevic centered on this—I cannot say for sure, I will be seeing him today, he is expected in Sarajevo today. In any case, we are not contemplating that the Serbs could snatch away part of Bosnia and attach it to Serbia. We are not even dreaming of reviewing such an idea. We are in favor of a single Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, would you agree to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Serbs consented to remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina but made this conditional on the creation of a confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia?

[Izetbegovic] I believe I can give a brief reply to that: Out of the question.

[Ladisic] Does that mean that the creation of a new Yugoslavia under pressure from the world powers would also be out of the question?

[Izetbegovic] I think there is too much speculation surrounding the world powers' ideas on the creation of a new Yugoslavia. As far as I could deduce from my contacts, such an idea is not being entertained by serious, responsible people in the west. I am not saying that certain individuals are not in favor of such a thing, but I believe that such an idea is not being voiced as a realistic possibility—I have not heard anything to this effect so far, in any form. There has been talk about certain forms of cooperation between the states created on the ruins of the old Yugoslavia—economic cooperation—but nobody had even hinted at the creation of some state entity.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, one of my last questions. Please, if I failed to ask you something, feel free to say. How do you see the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Are we any closer to the final peace? What do you consider to be the biggest problem, and what do you look at with most optimism?

[Izetbegovic] I can say with certainty that with this agreement with the Croats here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with the agreement between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as states—these agreements have not yet been signed, ratified—we are on the right path to achieve it, we have definitely made a giant step toward peace. However, the behavior of the Serb side remains an open issue. I cannot forecast their behavior no matter how hard I try, and therefore I could not answer whether peace is a matter of a month or two. However, I have a sort of premonition that by the end of late autumn peace will return to these areas. This is more of premonition than a rational assessment.

[Ladisic] President Izetbegovic, thank you for participating in our Croatian TV program.

Social Democrats Support Federation Accord

AU0803150294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 March 94

[Text] The Presidency of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina supports the preliminary agreement on establishing a federation in the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a majority Bosniak and Croatian population as a significant step toward reaching a complete solution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue.

This presupposes creating the possibility and finding a way to include the Serbian [words indistinct] generally solving the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus the agreement is very valuable in terms of the cessation of combat activities and the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are necessary conditions for making political decisions that would ensure lasting peace in the region.

We want to point out in particular that we expect on the basis of the text of the agreement, along with the devising of more efficient mechanisms and instruments, the full protection of human rights, the return of the refugees, and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law.

The agreement requires the active and honest engagement of all political factors and the creation of a political consensus to find the best constitutional solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, the outline of the preliminary agreement on establishing a confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation is a significant step and a serious basis for a principled normalization of relations with the neighboring republics, which will at the same time make it possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to integrate itself more easily into European cultural, economic, and political currents.

Therefore, we demand of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina the broadest political consultations and the opportunities for full participation in creating constitutional solutions, reads the public statement by the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Srpska Official Calls for New Peace Conference

LD0903141694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1231 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Jagodina, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the Assembly of the Srpska republic, said today that by first offering a draft solution on the basis of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan and then failing to meet its obligations from the draft, the European Union had wasted its chances of playing a more active role in the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.

The Serbs were asked to agree on 33.3 percent of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Muslims; to allow the replacement of the Canadian battalion in

Srebrenica; to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo; and to allow the opening of Tuzla airport, while in return the EU would do its utmost to ensure that the sanctions imposed on the Serb people were lifted as a matter of urgency, Krajisnik told Jagodina Radio today.

We have met all our commitments but the EU has done nothing to lift the sanctions. The EU alone is to be blamed for losing our trust and its reputation, and from now on any EU proposal will be met with a large amount of reservation, Krajisnik said.

On the other hand, Washington's proposal for a federation and confederation of Muslims and Croats and speculations about the Serbs joining the Muslim-Croat agreement indicate, to say the least, an inability to view the situation on the ground realistically, Krajisnik said, and went on to add:

It is only by pressure that a federation and confederation of Croats and Muslims can be set up; however, not even force can secure Serb participation.

In view of the above I think that the most logical way forward would be to sum up the negotiations so far, to decide if the Owen-Stoltenberg plan is dead, and to convene a new conference in which all three sides would take part and at which fresh proposals for territorial divisions between the three national communities would be submitted, Krajisnik said and went on to stress:

It is only the issue of territories that can be discussed realistically since we have already committed ourselves to a union of three independent states in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Krajisnik said in conclusion.

Report on Silajdzic, Granic Visits to Moscow

AU0903203294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Vlasimir Mijovic report from Moscow]

[Text] Today's one-day visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic to Moscow passed without any of the spectacular statements that usually, though without any substance, adorn diplomatic talks on Bosnia.

They discussed peace initiatives, the engagement of the Russian troops in Bosnia, territorial divisions, and the Washington Muslim-Croatian agreement. During separate meetings with Andrey Kozyrev and Vitaliy Churkin, Silajdzic also raised the issue of establishing diplomatic relations of the government in Sarajevo with the Kremlin.

Judging from the statements that the protagonists of today's talks gave to journalists, nothing has happened that would give a new, more decisive impetus to the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. This especially refers to the meeting of Haris Silajdzic and Andrey Kozyrev, whose talks seemed to have been primarily of a courtesy nature.

What will influence the current peace process happened behind the doors of Moscow's Savoy Hotel, where Silajdzic and Yeltsin's special envoy for former Yugoslavia Vitaliy Churkin held direct talks. It is only natural that talks behind closed doors are more frank; however, the public is told considerably less than could be said. Before Silajdzic's arrival in Moscow, there was much speculation about important messages that Radovan Karadzic would like to convey to the Bosnian prime minister via a Russian intermediary. Unfortunately, nothing can be said about their contents.

The Kremlin today also learned first hand of Croatia's views. Immediately after Silajdzic, the head of Croatian diplomacy Mate Granic entered one of the elite negotiating buildings of the Russian Foreign Ministry. He would not disclose the reasons for his hasty arrival in Moscow either, but it is hard to believe that the reason could be a mere routine exchange of opinions.

In any case, the results of today's Moscow talks will become more certain when Russian and U.S. diplomatic heads Kozyrev and Christopher meet in Vladivostok next Monday. It is no longer a secret that Washington and Moscow will shape (?importantly) the final agreement to end the Bosnian crisis. This has been Vlasimir Mijovic, permanent OSLOBODJENJE correspondent from Moscow, reporting specially for Bosnia-Herzegovina Television.

Ganic on Local Distrust of Russian UN Troops

AU0903170294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Member Ejup Ganic received representatives of the Russian Battalion today, which as a part of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] is carrying out its duties in the [Serb-held] Sarajevo district of Grbavica.

After welcoming them, Dr. Ganic explained the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Russian UNPROFOR soldiers and emphasized that the Serbs are not the only ones to have the exclusive privilege of cooperation with Russia. The legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities want this cooperation, too. However, as Dr. Ganic said, very little is known in Russia about the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian media do not have the correct information about the events on these territories. When the war is over, Ganic said, some politicians will perhaps have to answer for concealing war crimes committed on the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The reason for today's meeting with the representative of the Russian UN Battalion was also the mistrust of citizens toward these soldiers, especially after seeing the television footage of their arrival in Pale. However, it does not seem that there will be any major problems.

The representatives of the Russian forces—Assistant Commander of the Sector South (Aleksandar Mihaylovic) [word indistinct] and Commander of the Russian Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina Victor (?Vorodilov)—emphasized that they are merely a part of UNPROFOR and only accountable to the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council.

Swedish Foreign Minister Meets With Ganic

AU0903171294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] We have just received a report that Swedish Foreign Minister Baroness Margaretha Af Ugglas after her visit to Tuzla also visited Sarajevo today where she held talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Ejup Ganic. Nedzad Leko reports:

[Begin recording] [Leko] After the talks with Dr. Ganic, Baroness Margaretha Af Ugglas stated to the journalists:

[Ugglas, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] I am very glad to be here because of the changes that have taken place in Sarajevo and because of the end of terrorist attacks on the town. I am also satisfied with the talks that are currently under way between the Bosnian and the Croatian Governments. Sweden supports the Washington agreement. We believe that there are numerous constructive elements in this agreement and I am pleased that Mr. Ganic sees it as a very positive matter.

I would like to say that the international engagement on Bosnia's behalf will continue. Once peace is restored, perhaps we will no longer need the Nordic battalion. However, Sweden will be here as a partner in the reconstruction of the country. I have also told Mr. Ganic that Sweden would like very much to help Sarajevo, which is alive and not a ghost town.

[Leko] The journalists were then addressed by Dr. Ejup Ganic:

[Ganic, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] [passage indistinct] blockade of Sarajevo. Since there is no more shelling, we wish to secure the return of citizens to their homes in all suburbs of Sarajevo. This is our next step. We also informed the guest about our desire to continue negotiations. We will call upon the Serbs to join the talks to find a solution for Bosnia, as there is enough space for everybody in the federation while the entire world wishes to make use of this advantageous moment. It is very encouraging to hear that our friends will stand by us in the future.

[Leko] Answering a journalist's question about the impressions after yesterday's visit to Tuzla, Baroness Margaretha Af Ugglas said:

[Ugglas, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] My impression is that there is still plenty of work to be done. There is a blockade and the industry around Tuzla cannot work because of it. However, I am encouraged with public works that are being carried out in the town itself, for example, the cleaning of the town. I believe that this is important. I was also satisfied with the work of the Nordic battalion. The situation in Tuzla is now more peaceful, however, there are still unpleasant incidents which is definitely something that we should combat, because I believe that our battalion should carry out its work in peaceful conditions.

What is very encouraging is that the airport has now been taken over by the Nordic battalion and that it will soon be opened for delivery of humanitarian aid. [end recording]

UN Observes Cease-Fire Violations in Sarajevo

AU0903173994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] UN military observers yesterday noted several cease-fire violations in the Sarajevo region, for which the soldiers of the Serbian aggressor's side were responsible.

Thus, one Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldier was killed and two were injured in the vicinity of (?Hrasnica). On that occasion one aggressor's soldier was injured, too.

According to Major Jose (La Bandeira), UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] military representative in Sarajevo, one French soldier sustained minor injures on Mt. Igman yesterday when Karadzic's Serbs opened fire toward a French unit. Fire was also opened at French soldiers in (?Dupovici) yesterday, however, the shooting stopped when the French returned fire.

Major Jose (La Bandeira) says that six aggressor's howitzers continue to be positioned in Ilijas, 900 meters inside the zone that is supposed to be free of heavy arms. He did not explain, though, what UNPROFOR will do to remove these arms.

Serb Attack Kills Seven in Bihac, Maglaj

LD1003084194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] The region of Bihac remains the focus of aggressor's offensive. Throughout yesterday the aggressor used howitzers, in particular, and tanks to pound the area. Three civilians were killed and dozens injured. The aggressor also attacked the defense lines and threatened the Bihac-Cazin road. Forces of the so-called "autonomasi" [anti-Izetbegovic forces] have been also been very active.

Attacks on Maglaj were of a slightly lesser ferocity but there were civilian fatalities nevertheless. Chetnik snipers, howitzers and mortars killed four civilians. Infantry attacks were repulsed. The humanitarian situation in the town is exceptionally difficult.

'Chetnik' Attacks on Maglaj, Brcko, Bihac

AU1003112894

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 10 March within its regular 8-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the Republic.

Reporting from Maglaj, Hajrudin Fermic says that "the chetniks are once again showing their criminal face and as well as an intention to kill as many civilians as possible and ruin the city. To do so, they are indiscriminately using all means, shells of all calibers, snipers, antiaircraft weapons. Yesterday afternoon, a new massacre was carried out in Maglaj: One person was killed and 13 civilians seriously wounded from a tank shell fired on the very center of the city from (Procijep). Many of those people will remain permanently disabled. Unfortunately, before this, four people were also killed yesterday by snipers and howitzer shells and mortar bombs. If we recall that the chetniks have again sent back a convoy carrying food, the picture of the Maglaj inferno, of the sufferings and agony of the population will be complete."

Hamiz Deronjic reports from Brcko that "last night on the Brcko battlefield did not pass without aggressor's attacks. The enemy used 82-mm mortars to pound Vranovaca, Cupici, (Kladanj), and [name indistinct], while infantry battles were waged in [words indistinct] of the Brcko battlefield." Further on, Deronjic says that "the aggressor's regrouping on the Brcko battlefield is more and more (?intensive). During last night, movements of enemy military trucks were noticed along the Donja Mrka-Lipovac-Donji (Radjici) line. Movements of chetnik armored vehicles have been observed on the central section of the Brcko battlefield, as well as along the Potocari-[name indistinct] line."

A correspondent reading a report by the 3d Corps (?Press Center) reports that "the chetnik offensive on the Zavidovici battlefield is going on" and that, as for other regions covered by the 3d Corps, "chetnik artillery is shelling (?Bugojno, (Dubac), and the free villages of the Donji Vakuf and Gornji Vakuf regions. Zenica and Travnik were shelled with a shower of projectiles. The truce signed between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) is being respected in general. However, there are still provocations, particularly by sniper fire."

Izudin Durakovic reports from Gracanica that "last night on this section of the battlefield passed in occasional provocations with antiaircraft machine-guns and antiaircraft guns on the defense positions and with Bofors guns on populated places. The defense lines are still stable and unchanged."

Mirza Sadikovic reports that "in the last 24 hours, the Serb aggressor's attacks on Bihac gained in intensity. Artillery and infantry assaults on the defense lines on both Bihac section of the battlefield and the Grmusko-Srbljanski Heights are particularly frequent." "Several howitzer shells were fired from (Goriok) at Bihac (?and its) outskirts and [name indistinct] region, as well as the Bihac-[name indistinct] road and villages on the right bank of the Una River are under constant artillery fire."

UNHCR Convoy Without Military Escort Blocked

AU0903170694 Paris AFP in English 1642 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 9 (AFP)—A UNHCR humanitarian aid convoy blocked at Teslic, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from the north-west Bosnian town of Maglaj does not have a UN military escort, the UNHCR admitted Wednesday.

"We didn't ask UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] escort since it is not operating in this area," Peter Kessler, spokesman for the UN High Commission for Refugees said.

Asked about the UN Protection Force's mandate for protecting humanitarian convoys, UNPROFOR spokesman Major Jose Labandeira said the organisation had not agreed to force the convoy's passage through blockades.

"We don't want to use force. If we do it, they (the local Bosnian Serb militia) can destroy bridges and put mines on roads," Labandeira said.

Kessler said that the last UNHCR convoy which tried to get into Maglaj on October 26 was given a UN military escort. Two of the convoy's driver's were killed in the action.

Maglaj, which has a majority-Moslem population, has been under seige by Serb forces since last June.

UNHCR has supplied Maglaj by airdrops, some of which fell onto Serb lines, Kessler said. [passage omitted]

General Divjak Announces New Army Corps

AU0903203894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Brigadier General Jovan Divjak [ethnic Serbian deputy commander of B-H Army] spoke about the current military-political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the agreement between our country and Croatia at a roundtable discussion organized by the Liberal Bosnian [as heard] Organization today.

According to Divjak, the pressure exerted by the United States, and especially the Vatican, on Tudjman has yielded results. The cease-fire agreement reached with members of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] is mainly being observed. Generals Delic and Roso [of the B-H Army and the HVO, respectively] should meet in Split or Geneva in two days to define the principles of the military agreement.

According to this agreement, there would initially be a joint command for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO. This command would later be transformed into an unified command. The day when the third side will enter the federation is not far away, Divjak said.

The enemy's attempts to cut through the forces of the 2d and 3d Corps by capturing Maglaj and attacking Vozuca from Olovo have failed. The offensive on Bihac and the Cazin Krajina has not yielded results either. The cases of resistance to mobilization, a lack of military discipline, and crime have become increasingly frequent in the [Serbian] occupied territories. It is thought that [leader of the Bosnian Serb military] General Mladic is out of favor as he did not succeed in accomplishing his aims in Sarajevo, the Krivaja valley, the Posavina region, and the Neretva valley. General Milovanovic is being mentioned as his replacement.

What is also important is that two brigades under the command of Fikret Abdic have refused to take any further part in combat actions against the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is very good. The front with the HVO has been freed. The 7th Army Corps has been founded in the Vrbas valley. According to Divjak, the founding of a corps that would assume responsibilities in the Drina valley is also being considered.

Divjak stressed that the social situation of the fighters is very bad. The question of accountability for the loss of some territories has also been raised. The key person responsible for the loss of Mount Igman is under investigation.

General Divjak particularly emphasized the differences between demilitarization and protected zones. The demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be discussed only after Serbia and Croatia have been demilitarized. The demilitarization of Sarajevo cannot be discussed while enemy soldiers are around the city, Divjak said. Just because the street cars have started operating, or because there was a soccer match between UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and Sarajevo teams we must not neglect the situation in Maglaj and Mostar, or the humanitarian situation in the republic. This is having adverse effects on other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Divjak said.

Muslim Offensive in Doboj Continues

LD1003125194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1206 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Doboj, Mar 10 (TANJUG) - Moslem formations continued on Thursday their offensive on Serb settlements and positions in the broader area of the Serb-controlled town of Doboj, in northern Bosnia.

The strongest Moslem attacks with artillery support are taking place on Mount Ozren and Mount Trebava, south and east of Doboj.

Bosnian Serb military sources said that Moslem troops from Zavidovici are trying to make a breakthrough in the area on Mount Ozren in a bid to link up with Moslem forces from Maglaj.

The same source said that Serb fighters stopped the attackers with effective fire and forced them to retreat.

The Bosnian Serb Army command said that Moslem Leader Alija Izetbegovic had ordered all his units to take Doboj and Mount Trebava at any cost and that fresh units from central Bosnia have been brought into the Zavidovici area for this purpose since Moslem-Croat fighting there had abated in intensity.

Moslem units launched several attacks on Serb positions north of Maglaj, in northern Bosnia, Bosnian Serb military sources said.

The Herzegovina corps of the Bosnian Serb Army said on Thursday that Moslem formations on several ocassions opened infantry fire on Serb positions between Mostar and Nevesinje, in southwestern Bosnia, on Wednesday afternoon.

After the fire was responded to, the provocations ceased, it was said. A complete lull reigned on this part of the front during the past several months.

Croats Report Muslims Violating Cease-Fire

LD0803204094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1908 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 8 (TANJUG)—Moslem forces on Tuesday fired mortar shells at a school in the Croat village of Uzdol near Prozor in central Bosnia.

Moslems thus violated the ceasefire which they had agreed with Croats on February 25, warned a statement by the defence ministry of the Bosnian Croat state of Herceg-Bosna in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zagreb-based Croatian Radio said.

The radio also said that Moslem forces were bringing in reinforcements and regrouping their troops around Uskolje (former Gornji Vakuf) in central Bosnia.

Heavy clashes between local Moslems and Croats, former allies in their war against Bosnian Serbs, have been underway in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina for over a year. The clashes have not ceased even after the two sides agreed to form a Moslem-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement was signed by representatives of Bosnian Moslems and Croats in Washington on March 1, under strong pressure from the United States.

Moslem forces opened strong infantry and artillery fire on Serb villages and positions in the area of Mt. Ozren, northern Bosnia, on Monday and Tuesday, Bosnian Serb military sources said.

The army of the Serb republic repulsed a Moslem combined artillery-infantry attack in the region of this mountain, the sources said.

Strong Moslem infantry attacks were also repulsed in the valley of the River Trebava and around Maglaj in northern Bosnia.

Moslem forces used helicopters to scout Bosnian Serb army positions in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the United Nations resolution on a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croats Oppose Placing Mostar Under EU Control

LD0903163094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1508 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 9 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croats oppose the placing of Mostar under European Union (E.U.) protection, TANJUG on Wednesday learned from well-informed sources.

They are going to propose that this city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina be included into the Bosnian Croat state, while the Moslems would get one of the Mostar municipalities, i.e. the section mostly Moslem-populated before the war.

TANJUG learned that an E.U. mission, made up of high-ranking Greek, German and Belgian officials, is due to arrive in Mostar in the next few days, with a view to determining the possibilities of the establishment and implementation of the E.U. protectorate.

The Serbs residing in Mostar have been excluded from the division. Before the war broke out in April 1992, 24,000 Serbs lived in Mostar, accounting for one-third of the population. 44,000 Moslems, 43,000 Croats and 12,000 residents, who declared themselves as Yugoslavs, have lived in Mostar at that time. The E.U. protectorate would ensure the return of the Serbs, who have been forced to leave the city under Moslem-Croat pressure. Over 45,000 Serbs have been expelled from Mostar and the Neretva valley and nearly all of their homes, churches, monasteries and cemeteries have been plundered, and burned and torn down. Since early 1993, fierce Moslem-Croat clashes have been taking place in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which the city of Mostar has been completely destroyed.

Under strong pressure from the United States, representatives of the Bosnian Moslems and Croats along with Croatian representatives signed in Washington on March 1 a preliminary agreement on setting up a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would subsequently enter into a confederation with Croatia, but the hostilities have never ceased.

Mortar Shells Hit Center of Tuzla

AU0903163494 Paris AFP in English 1621 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 9 (AFP)—Three heavy mortar shells fell on the city centre on Wednesday, the first such attack in two weeks against the UN-protected north-east Bosnian city.

The shelling which shook the city and sent people scuttling indoors at 4:30 p.m. took place just a day after the city's airport was placed under UN control.

Alarm sirens screeched and an ambulance raced to the site of the attack but no immediate information was available on possible casualties.

Bosnian Serbs are dug into positions some 10 kilometres (six miles) from the city.

Troops from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) officially took control Tuesday of the airport some 15 kilometres (10 miles) outside the city in order to airlift aid to some 700,000 hungry civilians.

It was not immediately known whether or not the airport had been hit.

Tuzla Airport To Reopen in 7-10 Days

LD0803161394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1508 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Text] Geneva, March 8 (TANJUG)—Spokeswoman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sylvana Foa on Tuesday announced that the airfield near Tuzla, a Moslem-controlled town in north-eastern Bosnia, would be reopened in 7-10 days if everything went as planned.

At a press conference, Foa stated precisely that an agreement would be signed, envisaging which air corridors would be used and which countries would use the airfield near Tuzla. Runway of the airfield requiring a thorough repair is the greatest problem at the moment, said Foa.

The U.N. Nordic battalion on Monday began to deploy troops around the airfield near Tuzla. The agreement on the opening of the airfield near Tuzla was reached after Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had given his consent, provided Russian observers controlled all air shipments, to make sure no arms, ammunition and equipment were supplied to the Bosnian Moslems.

Humanitarian land convoys pass through Bosnia mainly unhindered, said Foa and added that 7,320 tonnes of food, medicine and clothes were distributed last week, accounting for 73 percent of the total needs. She confirmed it was the highest total reached by the U.N. in that former Yugoslav republic.

Foa, however, accused the Bosnian Serb side of what she called stopping of the convoys headed for Tuzla and eastern enclaves.

Bosnian Serbs check the contents of the convoys, because earlier experience had proved that they transported arms and equipment to the Moslems. Checking of the convoys does not mean their stopping, because all of them passed unimpeded and safely through the Bosnian Serb territory and reached the Moslem territories, as was confirmed by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] reports.

The bulk of humanitarian aid to which foa referred arrives from Yugoslavia via the Bosnian Serb territory to the Moslems, because this is the safest way since land routes from Croatia to Bosnia are unsafe due to one-year-old bitter Croat-Moslem fighting in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UN Convoy Reaches Srebrenica To Evacuate Troops

AU0903213494 Paris AFP in English 2116 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Visoko, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 9 (AFP)—A 25-vehicle UN Canadian convoy reached the eastern Moslem enclave of Srebrenica Wednesday to evacuate Canadian infantry troops blocked there by Serb forces for over four months, officials said.

Canadian Captain George Petrokeleas said in Visoko, 40 kilometres (25 miles) northwest of Sarajevo, that the convoy's arrival meant that "a long and frustrating time is now over."

The infantry troops are to help monitor a Croat-Moslem ceasefire in central Bosnia. "We've needed them here for a long time. We didn't have enough infantry," he said.

The convoy of the Royal 22nd Regiment was to pick up 69 Canadian UN troops and their equipment and take them to Visoko.

Serb forces have for months blocked the rotation out of Srebrenica, a UN-declared safe haven. The Serbs said the number of UN troops in the enclave, at full strength 160 Canadians before they started leaving last week, should not be increased.

But some 350 Dutch troops arrived in Srebrenica last week to relieve the Canadians. The Dutch UN force there is eventually to number about 600.

The Canadian convoy was held up at a Serb checkpoint about 25 kilometres (15 miles) northwest of Sarajevo for 30 hours before continuing its trek on Tuesday.

The Serbs said they did not want tracked vehicles on their roads anymore.

The convoy included five Cougar tanks and 15 trucks.

Sarajevo Receiving 5,000 Tons of Food Daily

AU1003142594 Paris AFP in English 1408 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 10 (AFP)—A French transport aircraft Thursday brought in the 100,000th ton of food aid to reach the Bosnian capital since the air lift began 20 months ago.

Its load mainly of flour was for the 350,000 people of Sarajevo still besieged by Bosnian Serb forces, although a ceasefire has been in force for the past month.

General Andre Soubirou, commander of the French contingent of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Sarajevo, said the airlift had enabled every Sarajevan to receive 500 grams (nearly one pound) of food per day.

At present 5,000 tons of food are being brought in every day, 80 percent of it by air on British, Canadian, French and U.S. transports flying from Split and Zagreb in Croatia, or from Frankfurt in Germany.

At the same time, 500 badly-wounded victims of Serb mortar, shell or sniper fire have been evacuated for treatment abroad since the air lift officially began on July 3, 1992.

The airport straddles the front lines of the conflict, with each end of the runway in the hands of the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Army and the sides controlled by the Serbs.

In the middle are the UNPROFOR troops, presently numbering 1,300 mainly French soldiers.

More than 100 UN soldiers have been wounded while guarding the airport, which until the ceasefire was regularly closed because of shelling or because aircraft were hit by small-arms fire.

Hundreds of people, both civilians and troops of the warring sides, have also tried to cross the opposing lines by way of the airport. UNPROFOR has orders to send them back each time they are caught, in line with an agreement declaring the facility neutral.

Problems for Aid Convoys Despite Cease-Fire

AU1003083194 Paris AFP in English 0800 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Article by Michael Adler]

[Text] Visoko, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 10 (AFP)—In the center of the Moslem town of Visoko, haggard people crowd sidewalks and occasionally spill into streets as they haggle in black market trade.

Prices here are high, up to 70 German marks (42 US dollars) for one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of coffee, while in Kiseljak, a town Moslems from Visoko besiege in Bosnia's war, the price is eight marks. Cooking oil is 20 marks a litre in Visoko, four marks in Kiseljak.

In one of the paradoxes of war, Croats in besieged Kiseljak in central Bosnia are eating better and paying less than the Moslems who surround them.

The key is a narrow front the Kiseljak pocket has with Bosnian Serb forces, who continue to allow Croats to move supplies through their lines despite Serb anger over Moslem-Croat rapprochement, UN military officers and a leading Moslem businessman said Wednesday in Visoko, eight kilometres (five miles) northeast of Kiseljak.

The Serbs, under international sanctions for being the aggressor in Bosnia since fighting began in April 1992, are too needy themselves to pass up chances for food, fuel or hard currency.

An additional irony is that most of the goods coming into Visoko that are not UN humanitarian aid are from Kiseljak. The Bosnian war is between neighbors and there has been a continuous and considerable amount of trading across front lines.

Kiseljak is a sleepy, sprawling place of only a few thousand people with two small main streets and a suburban, residential feel surprisingly untouched by the war.

Visoko is a small city with a pre-war population of 48,000, now swollen by refugees. Many of its Turkish-style wooden houses with red-tile roofs, built along a curve in the Bosna river, are damaged by shelling.

UN Canadian Lieutenant Bruno Vanasse told AFP the Croats bring in a convoy once a week from Split, in Bosnian neighbor Croatia on the Adriatic coast. The convoy detours through Croat-held territory in southern Bosnia to avoid Moslem lines in the center of the former Yugoslav republic.

It then approaches Sarajevo from Serb-held territory in the southeast. Somewhere near Pale, 15 kilometres (nine miles) southeast of Sarajevo, the Croats pay their "tax" to the Serbs—30 percent of the goods in the convoy, Vanasse said.

The convoy enters Kiseljak through a Serb checkpoint just southeast of Kiseljak.

Vanasse said this arrangement has not changed despite the Croats and Moslems declaring a ceasefire in their fighting February 28 and moving to create a political federation, which for the moment has isolated the more powerfully armed Serbs against a common front though diplomatic efforts are underway to try to bring the Serbs into the process.

Asmir Hodic, a leading Moslem businessman in Visoko, told AFP the Serbs were furious about the Moslem-Croat alliance but were not about to stop the convoys to Kiseljak.

The only retaliation they have made is to demand six tons of fuel, instead of the previous three tons, as part of the price of entry to Kiseljak.

Hodic is himself an active trader with the Croats, exchanging leather goods made in his family factory and coffins in his funeral business against food. He has become one of the few people to use a UN checkpoint set up last week to guarantee freedom of movement on the road between Kiseljak and Visoko, Vanasse said.

Asmir, 27, runs the city funeral parlor in Visoko. He said he gives away most of the food he gets from Kiseljak but does sell some of it on the black market since it is the only way to buy the wood and parts needed for coffins as Visoko's city administration has no money.

Granic Calls Washington Agreement 'Historic'

AU1003125994 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 94 p 3

[V. Staresina report on news conference by Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Mate Granic in Zagreb; date not given: "The Way to the Final Solution"]

[Text] The Washington agreement is a historic one because it marks a definite geostrategic orientation of Croatia toward the West, and everything that follows, and the complete conciliation of the Croats, except certain marginal people, concerning the concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina and connecting Croatia to the Bosnia- Herzegovina federation. The current negotiations in Vienna concern the constitution of the future federation. In the next few days, the delegations in Vienna should determine the intercantonal demarcations, especially in central Bosnia, after which the negotiations on the demarcation toward the Serbs will follow. Once the relations with the Serbs are settled, then follow the talks on the model of the confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, said Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, before leaving for Moscow, where, as he remarked, he was going to demand a confirmation of the Russian recognition of the territorial sovereignty of Croatia.

Minister Granic pointed out that the Washington agreement was the expression of the continuity of Croatian politics, which has supported the model of a decentralized Bosnia-Herzegovina and the proposed peace plans since the beginning—from Cutiliero's to Vance-Owen's to Owen-Stoltenberg's—which offered various degrees of decentralization. The Croat-Muslim talks on a confederation started as early as last fall, when several models of the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its relations with Croatia were discussed.

"However, there was no realistic force from the outside that would support one of the peace plans and become involved in their implementation, until, after the stagnation in the Geneva talks, the United States signaled that it would implement the agreement in consultation with Russia and the European Union," said Dr. Granic, adding that, following the U.S. decision to become actively involved in the peace process, U.S. Vice President Al Gore talked to President Tudjman on the phone, telling him about the U.S. initiative, which was accepted immediately, while, in the final stage of the Washington negotiations, President Clinton talked to the Croatian president. During the Washington negotiations, the consultations between Washington and Moscow, Washington and the European allies, and Granic and Tudjman were practically constant.

"The reaching of the agreement was welcomed by practically all the important countries. Many European countries congratulated President Tudjman. The only country in which the agreement has been received with some anxiety is Serbia," said Minister Granic, adding that the Bosniak side also accepted the agreement very well, that all the members of its delegation involved in the negotiations were interested in the confederation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and Croatia, and that the results on the ground, primarily those related to the ending of the conflict between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, were beyond expectations.

As far as the special solutions are concerned, Granic said that western Bosnia would be a canton with the Muslim majority and one Croat municipality, while its demarcation with the Serbs is left to be negotiated. Posavina will be a canton with a Croat majority, considerably extended in relation to the present territory held by the Croats and Muslims, and will contain a corridor for the Serbs, but just a corridor.

Talking about the pressures on the Croats regarding the reaching of an agreement, Minister Granic said that the Croat delegation entered the negotiations with thoroughly worked-out models that also contained the proposal of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and its confederation with Croatia, as the United States had the information that most Bosniaks also wanted the same and just needed a mighty force that would support those wishes and give guarantees for their realization. Regarding the occupied areas of Croatia, Minister Granic says there are no written guarantees, but that U.S. Vice President Gore offered U.S. assistance in their reintegration should the agreement with the Muslims be reached. Croatia, on the other hand, will offer the United Nations, or rather the secretary general, its proposal for solving the problem of UNPA [United Nations Protected Area] zones based on Security Council resolutions (even on the one regarding the control of borders) but which would contain the means for their implementation.

Referring to the possible future course of the negotiations, Minister Granic concluded that the reaching of the Washington agreement and the active involvement of the United States crossed the Rubicon on the way to the final solution, for without coordinating Croat-Muslim relations, the negotiations could not go forward, and that, for the first time, this laid a firm foundation for negotiations with the Serbs.

Returns From Moscow

LD1003103894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] This is Andjelko Perincic reporting from Zagreb airport for Croatian radio. Mate Granic, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia, returned to Zagreb at about 1000 this morning following his working visit to Russia. As reported yesterday, he had talks in Moscow with Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, and his deputy Vitaliy Churkin, who is also President Yeltsin's special envoy for former Yugoslavia. The main topic of the talks was the efforts to find solutions to the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Speaking about the state of overall Croatian-Russian relations following the talks yesterday, Minister Granic said:

[Begin recording] As for our bilateral relations, these are developing well and it is likely that later this year my official visit to the Russian Federation will take place, and that the prime ministers will also exchange visits. There is also the possibility of a top-level visit by the end of the year.

Our talks in Moscow were dominated by two important issues: on the one hand Bosnia-Herzegovina and the efforts to involve the third side, i.e. the Bosnian Serbs in the negotiations; on the other, the completion of the current and the possibility of a new, more active mandate for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and the normalization of overall Croat-Serb relations. In our view the talks were useful, substantive, and open. The talks will continue. [end recording]

Martic Sends Letter to Clinton About Crisis

LD1003151294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1446 GMT 10 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 10 (TANJUG)—President of the republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) Milan Martic proposed on Thursday to the U.S. President Bill Clinton to send a study delegation to "ascertain the historical and contemporary causes of the war in the former Yugoslavia."

In his letter to Clinton, the copy of which was given to TANJUG, Martic says that "the United States diplomatic body fails to gather information from the Serb side, and focuses its attention only on those given by Croatian, Moslem or Albanian sources."

Both the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade and American Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith act in this way, warns the president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, a republic proclaimed on the predominantly Serb-populated parts of Croatia in 1991, following Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslavia and the attempt to reduce the status of Serb people to that of an ethnic minority.

"Mr. Galbraith has never mentioned in his public appearances any of ethnic cleansing operations the Serbs have been exposed to in Croatia since 1990-1991," Martic says, bearing in mind that about 300,000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia under different pressures.

"Mr. Galbraith should know that Croatia killed about 1,200,000 Serbs during the World War Two, half of them in the Jasenovac death camp. He lays blame on Serbs alone, which is as great a sin as to blame the Jews for being massively burned by Germans in Hitler's death camps," Martic says.

He reminds Clinton of an incident in May 1992, when the Bosnian Moslems planted explosive in central Sarajevo, committing a crime against their own citizens so that they could blame Serbs for it, and this was why the U.N. imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which have had disastrous consequences so far. Serb babies die massively due to a lack of basic medicaments. For nearly two years Serbs have not been allowed either to import or export, while at the same time the war between Bosnian Croats and Moslems has been going on and no one has been punished for it, Martic says in his letter.

"I believe, Mr. President, that you would agree with me, if you only had the true information, that it is disastrous to equal the states such as Croatia and Moslem Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the states of free and democratic West," Martic says in his letter to Clinton.

Krajina Army Protests NATO Overflights

AU0903160494 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Statement for Belgrade Radio by Captain Nikola Miljanovic, head of the Press Center of the Serbian Army of Krajina; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] The command of the 21st Corps of the Serbian Army of Krajina has lodged a sharp protest with the commander of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] for Sector North because of the observed and established intelligence activities of NATO aircraft over Krajina, especially over Lika. We have not received a reply from UNPROFOR to this day.

Serbs Deny Firing at Spanish Plane on 9 Mar

LD0903145294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1335 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—The general staff of the Serb army of Krajina [SVK] stated today that SVK units had not fired at a Spanish plane above the region of Plaski [southern Croatia] yesterday, ISKRA [Croatian Serb news agency] has reported.

The general staff issued the statement in reaction to various reports and by the Croatian media in particular, that it was the SVK antiaircraft units that had fired at the Spanish plane.

According to ISKRA, the statement goes on to note that the SVK had no prior notice of the Spanish flight yesterday, and that in any case the plane was not spotted above the republic of Serb Krajina. [passage omitted]

RSK Informs Embassies of Croatian Offensive

LD0903211194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2003 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—The foreign ministry of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] today informed all diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade about the major Croatian offensive in the area of the village of Kozjan near Korenica and Mali Alan on Mt. Velebit, near Gracac, ISKRA reports.

Following minor provocations on 4 March, the Croatian Army intensified its activities and is bringing in reinforcements with strong artillery backing, the information says.

The representatives of diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade have been requested to inform their governments about these assaults by Croatia against the sovereignty of the RSK, and to raise the issue in international forums, in view of the fact that Croatia is violating all the cease-fire agreements signed with the RSK so far.

The Krajina Foreign Ministry warns that the latest attack against the RSK, if the Croatian offensive is not checked, could have dire consequences and could result in the escalation of the war in the region of former Yugoslavia.

Serbian Group Wants UN Mandate Extended

LD0903192394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] The Serb Democratic Forum, a nonparty organization for Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality, held a news conference in Zagreb today. A report by Nenad Kocmur:

[Kocmur] The Serb Democratic Forum holds that the UN presence in crisis areas in Croatia so far has produced some results, primarily in the halting of armed conflicts. According to Forum Chairman Milorad Pupovac, no important political changes have taken place in the field—there have been no agreements on cease-fire and demilitarization. Therefore, they are proposing a number of concrete activities to be taken:

[Begin Pupovac recording] First, the presidency of the Serb Democratic Forum believes that the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] mandate needs to be extended as long as possible in order to avoid the renewal of clashes by disputes on its extension which would create a stable time framework for the resolution of civilian and political issues.

Second, agreements governing a cease-fire and demilitarization should be reached as soon as possible. They should provide adequate control of pink zones, of separation lines, and the international political observation and control of possible irresponsible actions.

Third, full opening of all communications must be secured, both physical and commercial communications, which should be under the UNPROFOR mandate, on which the sides should be consulted, but are not expected to give their consent. [end recording]

[Kocmur] The mobilization of Serb citizens into the Croatian Army was also mentioned at the conference. Petar Lazovic, chairman of the political committee of the Serb Democratic Forum, stated that some mobilization drafts are unacceptable, because citizens who do not have Croatian citizenship or persons either under 18 or over 50 years of age have been receiving draft notices. In that regard a letter has been sent to top representatives of Croatian Government departments.

Army Continues Attacks in Kozjan Region

LD0903155094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1343 GMT 9 Mar 94

[Text] Knin, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—There has been no letup in attacks by the Croatian Army in the region of Kozjan, east of Korenica, for four days, ISKRA [Croatian Serb news agency] has reported. Fierce fighting took place yesterday and the aggressor used mortars, multiple rocket launchers, and infantry weapons, ISKRA says, quoting the information office of the Serb army of Krajina general staff. Serb defenders have been returning the attacks and are successfully holding the defense lines, the statement says.

There was no peace in northern Dalmatia yesterday either. The Croatian Army opened fire from infantry weapons throughout the Drnis area, on the free territory of Kasic, and on villages in the Novigrad hinterland, and in the direction of Benkovac. There were no casualties in the attacks and the Serb defenders responded to all enemy attacks, ISKRA says.

Gligorov Discusses Issues, 'Greek-Serbian Axis'

AU0903175794 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 9 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Gligorov's Interview to Bulgarian Television"]

[Text] In his interview for the Bulgarian National Television, President Gligorov stated several current issues of the political and economic situation in the country.

As for the Greek demands of changes in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Constitution and its flag, he stressed he "had never given nor can now give promises" for possible changes by Macedonia, but these issues can be discussed in an effort to seek compromises. But, he said, no negotiating is possible in conditions of embargoes and preconditions.

In reference to the "Greek-Serbian" axis, Papoulias' visit to Belgrade, and the embargo that followed afterward, President Gligorov said he considers mutual relations between the Balkan countries to be their internal affairs. It is only important to accept Macedonia as an independent and sovereign state, whose existence is a condition for peace and stability in the Balkans.

President Gligorov does not believe that additional troops in Macedonia, whether Russian or from any other country, are necessary. He said present UN peacekeeping forces are sufficient.

Asked on the latest radicalization of the Serbian party in Macedonia, Gligorov stated he does not expect any border incidents (although they are not completely excluded as long as the war is on), because Serbs in Macedonia are given all possible rights. "I would be happy to see such rights for the Macedonians in Serbia," he added. Gligorov said the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] split is a "normal process in a democratic state." The worst possible solution would be forming ghettos of any nationality. It is another issue what forces and what party option will come out as a winner.

Asked on Bulgarians in Macedonia, Gligorov said they have been given the opportunity to self-declare themselves in previous consensus.

The East-West corridor is a "priority matter" for the Macedonian president. Mr. Gligorov said he is personal friend with the Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev and said Mr. Zhelev is a man of wide democratic views close to his own.

Production Fell 19 Percent in Jan

AU0803175294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 8 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Economic Info"]

[Text] According to the State Statistics Institute, the January industrial production in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], as compared with last year's monthly production figures, has decreased in average by 19 percent. The production of manufacturing machinery is marking the biggest fall of 37.5 percent, followed by the production of reproduction materials (8 percent) and the consumer goods (2.4 percent).

The January prices of the industrial products have gone up by 13.1 percent, the market prices by 22 percent and the living costs by 18.8 percent.

Federal

U.S. Involvement in Seeking Settlement Viewed

LD0903162194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1430 GMT 9 Mar 94

["Pool" item by Stevan Cordas]

[Text] Belgrade, March 9 (TANJUG)—Americans have invested all their political credibility in finding a comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the war-torn former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina after their own prescription.

Judging by the U.S. President's special envoy Charles Redman's visit to Belgrade on Tuesday, the Americans seem to be very anxious to find the solution, but, at the moment, they fail to come up with a clear conception of how to give a definite shape to the peace package.

The reason for the U.S. anxiousness is obviously a result of its wish to neutralize, as efficiently as possible, the Russian initiative in seeking a solution to the Bosnian conflict.

Following the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Redman indicated two phases of the peace process. He said that the first phase, which was almost finished, would complete a Moslem-Croat deal on setting up a federation made up of territories controlled by the two peoples and its later entering into a confederation with Croatia. The key to the solution, however, could not be found before reaching the following (second) phase, for which the U.S. needs the participation of the third warring nation, i.e., the Serbs.

Redman's visit to Belgrade was a "feel the pulse" operation and an attempt to solve essential matters "in passing." It is hard to tell whether the U.S. official, while conferring with Milosevic and later with Bosnian Serb Republic Vice-President Nikola Koljevic, had found out what he came to Belgrade for. It was made clear to him, however, that the Moslem-Croat agreement is not binding for the Serb side.

Redman in Belgrade insisted on "an overall settlement" of the Bosnian crisis, but failed to specify what exactly he meant by that. He was also told that under the circumstances it was very hard for the Bosnian Serbs to take an integral stand.

The statements he made in Belgrade differ a great deal from a statement by U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. Redman, for instance, categorically argued that the Moslem-Croat agreement was not aimed against the Bosnian Serbs. On the other hand, Galbraith on Tuesday told the press conference in Zagreb the agreement's main aim was to put an end to the senseless conflict between the two nations, victims of the Serb aggression.

At a point when Redman tried to persuade the Bosnian Serbs of the necessity of their involvement in the latest peace process, Galbraith has offered them only an alternative—either to join the Moslem-Croat agreement and the West, or to continue the war.

Be that as it may, Charles Redman left unfinished the job he came to Belgrade for, so he is likely to come back for talks shortly.

Meanwhile, the Russians don't sit on their hands, either. Bosnian Moslem Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic were in Moscow on Wednesday.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher are scheduled to meet next Monday. To all appearances, the situation would somewhat clear up only after all these talks about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Appeal to UNHCR To Prevent FRG Expulsions

LD0903173894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1606 GMT 9 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, March 9 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Wednesday appealed to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to do everything in its power to prevent the forceful expulsion of Yugoslav citizens from Germany and that their status is determined before that.

The permanent Yugoslav mission at the Geneva U.N. headquarters sent a letter to U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata saying that Germany has not officially informed the Yugoslav authorities about its intention for the mass expulsion of Yugoslav citizens—Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians, who are being denied refugee status.

In question are 200,000 people whose requests for asylum in Germany were rejected, the letter said.

It underscored that Yugoslavia will not prevent the return of its citizens who have the correct documents, but warned that those persons who do not fulfill the requirements of the Yugoslav law, will not be able to enter Yugoslav territory.

If Germany expels such persons, UNHCR should prepare camps for them in Romania, the letter said.

If Germany carries out its threats, UNHCR should also act in Yugoslav territory to prevent the deterioration of the already grave situation regarding the refugees.

In Yugoslavia there are some 600,000 registered refugees from the breakaway ex-Yugoslav republics, and estimates are that there are at least 200,000 unregistered refugees living with relatives and friends.

Yugoslavia believes that UNHCR should insist that the German authorities strictly respect the 1951 Convention on the protection of refugees, the 1967 Protocol and

other relevant international documents, and thus prevent yet another humanitarian catastrophe, the letter said.

Bonn's decision to expel Yugoslav citizens is clearly aimed to exert political pressure on Yugoslavia. It is simultaneous with the persecution and arrests of Serbs in Germany on charges of alleged war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia.

At the same time, Bosnian Serb military sources claim that Moslem refugees are being rounded up in Germany and dispatched to the Moslem Army in the civil war-torn ex-Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Statistics Show 'Massive Impoverishment'

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[Text] Belgrade, Mar 9 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government, with its new economic measures, has eliminated hyperinflation and saved the national currency, the dinar, but it has not significantly improved the standard of living of the population which continues to be critically low.

According to federal statistics, although the cost of living for a four-member family in February has dropped by one-quarter as compared to January, average salaries are on a subsistence level.

According to statistics, a four-member family needed 440 new dinars (or 440 German marks) for a normal diet in January and 340 dinars in February.

Official data have not yet been published but estimates are that average salaries in February amounted to 50 dinars. This means that one needed almost seven salaries to ensure a quality diet.

Average salaries in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia amounted to 35 dinars (or 35 German marks) including payments in kind recieved by employees of many companies. In comparison, the average salary at the end of 1990 amounted to 560 German marks.

Massive impoverishment of the population began in 1991 when the Yugoslav Federation disintegrated, rocking the foundations of the economies of all six former members.

The drop of the standard of living became dramatic in May, 1992, when the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions on the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

The new economic measures, enforced late January, prevented a total financial and economic collapse and are being implemented without foreign aid or loans.